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ABSTRACT 
In two studies I examine how contextual information about the moral mind of the artist 
affects both children’s and adults’ response to works of art.  Study 1 examined liking 
ratings of artworks as well as utilitarian objects. Factors varied were whether the items 
were said to have been made vs. owned by people of negative vs. positive moral 
character.  Forty adults, 20 7-8-year-olds, and 23 4-5-year-olds were shown 12 artworks 
and 12 utilitarian objects and were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale how much they 
liked each one. Each item was presented as either owned or made by a person of positive 
or negative moral character. Moral character was predicted to affect liking ratings, with 
artworks expected to be affected more by the moral character of the maker than the 
owner, and utilitarian objects expected to be affected more by the moral character of the 
owner than the maker. Moral character had a significant effect on liking ratings: both 
artworks and utilitarian objects were liked less when believed to have been owned or 
made by someone of negative rather than positive moral character, demonstrating a moral 
contagion effect.  Contrary to prediction, believing that an artwork was made by a person 
of negative moral character did not depress liking ratings more than believing that the 
artwork was owned by an artist of negative character.  But consistent with prediction, 
believing that a utilitarian object was owned by a person of negative moral character 
depressed liking ratings more than believing that the object was made by someone of 
negative character.  These findings held for all three age groups.  
Study 2 examined both liking and evaluative judgment ratings for two kinds of 
artworks: those whose content is related to the artist’s moral character and those whose 
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content is unrelated to the artist’s character.  Sixty-seven adults, 24 7-8 year-olds, and 23 
4-5-year-olds were shown 12 representational paintings and were asked to indicate on a 
7-point scale how much they liked each one and how good they thought each one was.  
Moral character was expected to affect both liking and evaluative judgment ratings, and 
content-related works were expected to be liked less than content unrelated works for 
artists of negative moral character; no effect of content-relatedness was expected for the 
putatively more objective evaluative judgments. Results replicated the moral contagion 
effect found in Study 1 for liking as well as judgment ratings with negative moral 
character linked to lower ratings than positive moral character. As predicted, liking 
ratings were lower for related than unrelated content for works by artists of negative 
moral character. Contrary to prediction, the same result held for works by artists of 
positive moral character. Evaluative judgment ratings were not affected by whether the 
content was related or unrelated in the case of artists of negative character (as predicted), 
but for artists of positive character, unrelated images were judged better. Children ages 7-
8 behaved like adults for both liking and judgment ratings. Children ages 4-5 liked and 
judged as better the images with unrelated content for both mean and nice artists. Thus, 
adults and children ages 7-8-years old liked images more when the artist’s moral mind 
was not visibly displayed but judged the related/unrelated images as equally good—
indicating that the artistic mind (displayed through the arrangement of the composition, 
colors etc.) was more important for evaluations than was the moral mind. For 4-5-year-
olds, preferences did not diverge from evaluative judgments. Thus, what they liked was 
what they thought was good, and moral “right” was equivalent to aesthetic “right”.  
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Taken together, results lead to the conclusion that artworks are affected by moral 
contagion, but moral contagion affects liking more strongly than it affects evaluative 
judgment.     
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of aesthetic preferences has a long history beginning in the late 19th 
century with the first experimental psychologists (Birkhoff, 1933; Fechner, 1876; 
Guilford, 1934). During this time a great deal was revealed about the psychophysical 
properties that individuals find pleasing in artworks. For example, brighter hues are 
preferred to duller ones (Guilford, 1934), contrasting color combinations are preferred 
over non-contrasting ones (Granger, 1955), and harmonious and symmetrical patterns are 
preferred to asymmetrical forms (Birkhoff, 1933). While these studies revealed many 
facts about what people do and do not prefer, the studies were not theoretically motivated. 
The studies provided a compilation of likes and dislikes without illuminating the 
principles behind these preferences.    
In contrast to the atheoretical beginnings of experimental aesthetics, the “new 
experimental” aesthetics, founded by Daniel Berlyne, was based on a theory of two kinds 
of aesthetic response  (e.g., Berylne, 1970, 1971, 1974; Eysenck, Götz, Long, Nias, & 
Ross, 1984; Fechner, 1876; Götz, Borisy, Lynn, & Eysenck, 1979; Iwawaki, Eysenck, & 
Götz, 1979). (For reviews, see Kreitler and Kreitler [1972] and Winner [1982].) Berlyne 
noted that the first experimental aestheticians focused on how the psychophysical 
properties of art (i.e., formal properties such as size and brightness) affect arousal, while 
Freud and his followers focused on how the ecological properties of art (i.e., content 
related to experiences that are harmful, such as war, or beneficial, such as love or food) 
affect arousal. In contrast, Berlyne focused on “collative” variables (i.e., novelty, surprise, 
complexity, irregularity or asymmetry of elements) and examined how these affect 
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arousal and thereby cause pleasure. These variables were called collative because in order 
to evaluate how complex or how novel a work of art is, one must “collate” (compare) the 
work of art to others that one has experienced. A work of art is novel in relation to 
familiar works, complex in relation to simpler works, and surprising in relation to 
expected works. It was the collative variables that Berlyne found most important in terms 
of acting on arousal and leading to pleasure.  
Berlyne’s arousal theory (1970, 1971, 1974) led to experiments demonstrating 
that art yields pleasure by acting on our arousal system in two very different ways. 
Simple, regular forms in art lead to an arousal “boost”—a gradual increase in arousal 
which is experienced as pleasure. More complex, difficult to understand works lead to an 
arousal “jag”—a sharp increase in arousal that is experienced as tension, followed by a 
decrease in arousal once we have made sense of the work of art. It is the arousal decrease 
that is experienced as pleasure. In short, Berlyne presented experimental evidence to 
support his theory that artists manipulate collative variables to yield two kinds of 
pleasure: an arousal boost from familiar, regular patterns; and an arousal “jag” from 
patterns high in novelty or complexity. 
Studies in the tradition of the old and new experimental aesthetics are similar in 
one important respect: they all focus on people’s responses to what can be seen within the 
confines of an image, its visible properties. They leave entirely unexamined how our 
beliefs about the image affect our response to that image. When responding to artworks, 
we are not only influenced by their visible properties but also by beliefs that we bring to 
the artwork that are independent of the artwork’s visible properties – such as beliefs 
about the artist’s character and about the process by which the work was created. I refer 
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to this kind of non-visible information as “contextual” information. Looking at an 
artwork involves a discourse between the viewer, the work of art and the creator (the 
artist). Contextual information is non-visual information that is associated with the artist 
and the art work and that may affect our response to the artwork.  
In everyday life, across numerous social situations, we try to figure out what other 
people are thinking. We try to read people’s facial expressions in social situations, 
interpret the body language of a significant other in a romantic relationship, and analyze 
the behavioral habits of a child at school. In such situations, context can provide 
invaluable information. The context in which someone smiles is crucial to our 
understanding the meaning behind it. A smile in response to someone falling down a 
flight of stairs is malicious. But that same smile in response to someone crossing the 
finish line in a race is generous, kind, positive.  Just as context affects our interpretation 
of the meaning of someone’s behavior, context about a work of art (i.e., our knowledge 
about the artist who made it) may affect how we interpret (e.g., our liking and our 
evaluation) the work of art. In short, we may look to the story behind an artwork to help 
us understand its significance.   
Researchers have recently begun to consider how contextual information affects 
our response to artworks. I make a distinction here between two forms of contextual 
information that can affect a viewer’s understanding and experience of an artwork: 
contextual information that directly supplements the visible content in the work itself (i.e., 
descriptions and titles (Leder, Carbon & Ripsas, 2005; Millis, 2001; Russell 2003); and 
contextual information that indirectly supplements the content of an artwork by providing 
clues about the process of creation (how the work was created and the kind of person who 
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created it) (Bloom, 1996; 2004; Dutton, 2009; Gelman & Ebeling, 1998; Hawley-Dolan 
& Winner, 2011; Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000; Newman & Bloom, 2011). The studies 
reported here examine the influence of indirect contextual information on people’s 
responses to art. My primary question is how children’s and adults’ beliefs about the 
moral mind of the artist affects how much the artwork is liked and how good the artwork 
is judged to be.   
To provide a background, I first review what is known about the influence of 
direct contextual information on our responses to works of art (how much we like them 
and how good we think they are). More specifically I review information on the effects of 
titles on viewer response. I then review what is known about three kinds of indirect 
contextual information on our response to objects that are or are not works of art: 
information about origin, information about authenticity, and information about the 
maker or owner of the object (in particular, information about the maker/owner’s fame 
and morality). I also provide a brief review of the development of moral reasoning and 
theory of mind because both kinds of skills apply directly to the studies reported here. 
And lastly, because I assess both liking as well as evaluative judgments, I provide a brief 
overview of what is known about the differences between these two kinds of responses 
when responding to artworks. 
The Influence of Direct Contextual Information on Response to Works of Art 
Descriptive vs. elaborative titles. An artwork’s title may simply describe and/or 
identify what is depicted (e.g., Still Life with Fruit; Woman with Red Dress) or it may be 
expressive and elaborate on what is depicted (e.g., Loneliness; Victory). A descriptive 
title allows a viewer to identify objects and forms within an artwork. Descriptive titles 
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draw the viewer’s attention to objects within the visible space and often repeat what is 
already visible (Millis, 2001). For example, Picasso’s painting “Nude Woman With a 
Necklace” draws our attention to something that is already visible within the artwork—a 
nude woman with a necklace. The title is a literal reiteration of what is already depicted.  
A possible concern with literal titles is that they could constrain our 
interpretations. People are less likely to change their interpretations of representations 
after they have been encoded in long-term memory (Millis & Magliano, 1999). Thus, 
when provided with a direct interpretation of what is depicted, a viewer might become 
attached to a literal interpretation and be unable create new schemata. If Picasso had used 
a more elaborative or expressive title such as “Longing” the work might have allowed for 
a wider variety of responses, each based on personal associations and memories (Millis, 
2001).  
An elaborative title allows a viewer to go beyond what is depicted and gain a 
richer understanding of the meaning the artist intends to convey. Aesthetic experience 
ratings (including level of liking and of understanding) increase when an artwork is 
presented with an elaborative title (rather than a descriptive title) because such titles 
allow for flexible interpretations and representations that can be made based on personal 
experiences (Millis, 2001).  
Several researchers have examined the positive and negative effects of descriptive 
versus elaborative titles on aesthetic experience (both liking and understanding). Millis 
(2001) showed participants 30 representational artworks (15 black and white photographs 
and 15 colored illustrated works on paper) which were assigned either a descriptive title 
identifying what was present in the artwork (e.g. “Picking Flowers”), or a more 
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metaphorical title  (e.g., “One Day at a Time”) that could lead to associations beyond 
what was actually depicted. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions: no title, descriptive title, or elaborative title. They then rated their aesthetic 
experience on a six-point scale on five different dimensions: how well they understood 
the meaning of the artwork, how much they enjoyed the artwork, their level of interest, 
the extent to which artwork evoked emotions, and the extent to which artwork elicited 
thought. Millis was particularly interested in whether titles aided in people’s perceived 
understanding of an artwork. Therefore, he isolated the understanding score for the 
purposes of analysis. He found no difference between the self-reported level of 
understanding of artworks with descriptive titles versus elaborate titles. However, self-
reported understanding was lower when artworks were presented with no titles.   
A mean rating score was then computed combining all five dimensions to yield a 
total aesthetic experience score. There was an effect of title on both the illustrations and 
the photographs, but the effect was more pronounced for illustrations. The aesthetic 
experience score for illustrations was highest in the elaborative title condition, with no 
difference between the descriptive and the no title conditions (Millis, 2001). For 
photographs, the aesthetic experience score was higher in the elaborative title condition 
than in the no title condition, but was not higher than in the descriptive title condition. 
These results showed that the following: having a title increases perceived 
understanding of an artwork, but the type of title (descriptive vs. elaborative) does not 
matter for perceived understanding;  type of title affected perceived aesthetic experience; 
and elaborative titles aided more than descriptive ones in self-reported understanding of 
less realistic artworks (illustrations), but not in self-reported understanding of more 
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realistic artworks (photographs). Overall this study showed that elaborative titles led to 
higher aesthetic ratings than did the descriptive titles. Taken together these findings show 
that the more a title aids in an elaborated (but coherent and relevant) representation, the 
higher one’s aesthetic experience. 
While Millis (2001) examined the effects of titles on representational art, Leder, 
Carbon and Ripsas (2005) examined the effects of descriptive vs. elaborative titles on 
people’s understanding and appreciation of not only representational but also abstract 
artworks. In Experiment 1, participants viewed artworks under one of three randomly 
assigned conditions: no-title, descriptive title, and elaborative title. They then rated each 
artwork on six dimensions using a seven-point scale (1= fully agree, 7= fully disagree). 
Understanding referred to the extent to which participants believed they understood the 
artist’s intention; meaning referred to the extent to participants found a personal meaning 
in the artwork; liking referred to the extent to which participants liked the artwork; 
interest referred to the extent to which participants were interested in the artwork; 
emotion referred to the extent to which the artwork affected participants emotionally; and 
thoughts referred to the extent to which the artwork evoked thoughts for the participant. 
Representational paintings received higher ratings on all of the six variables than 
did abstract paintings. This is consistent with research by Parsons (1987) showing that 
people respond more favorably to representational than abstract paintings. The presence 
of a title increased the level of understanding in abstract but not in representational works. 
No other dimension was affected by whether the work was abstract or representational.  
Elaborative titles yielded higher “understanding” scores than did descriptive titles, and 
descriptive titles yielded higher understanding scores than did those with no titles.  Thus, 
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elaborative titles foster perceived understanding more than do descriptive ones, but type 
of title has no effect on liking, interest, emotions or thoughts.  
Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that when viewing time is limited, descriptive 
titles should yield greater perceived understanding than elaborative titles. In contrast, 
elaborative titles should foster greater perceived understanding when the viewer has a 
longer period of time to look at the work.  These hypotheses were based on a model of 
aesthetic appreciation proposed by Helmut Leder (Leder, Belke, Oeberst & Augustin, 
2004). According to this theory, we first respond to works of art in an automatic manner 
based on the work’s perceptual properties; this response is then followed by a more 
cognitively based, deliberative kind of response. With a longer time to view a painting, 
thoughtful deliberation can occur. With a shorter presentation time, thoughtful 
deliberation is less likely to occur because the viewer only has time to respond to the 
perceptual properties of the artwork. 
Only abstract works were examined in this experiment.  Participants viewed 
paintings for either one or ten seconds (the same paintings were used in both time 
conditions).  As predicted, ten second viewing times led to greater perceived 
understanding given elaborative rather than descriptive titles. One second viewing times 
led to greater perceived understanding given descriptive rather than elaborative titles. 
Leder et al. (2005) and Millis (2001) show that a viewer’s level of perceived 
understanding is aided by the contextual information provided by a title. Elaborative titles 
aid in people’s understanding of abstract artworks more than do descriptive titles (Leder, 
et al., 2005). There was no effect of kind of title (elaborative versus descriptive) on the 
level of “liking” of the artworks. And finally, Leder et al., (2005) showed that descriptive 
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titles are more helpful for immediate viewing (identifying objects and forms within an 
artwork), but with increased viewing time, more elaborative titles help people to 
understand artworks—or at least to feel that they have achieved an understanding.  
Thus far all of the studies reviewed have used explicit self-report measures of 
aesthetic response. But implicit measures such as eye gaze patterns may also be 
informative. By examining implicit measures we can determine people’s spontaneous, 
perhaps unconscious responses to artworks. At the very least it would be important to 
determine whether implicit measures yield results consistent with explicit measures. One 
study showed that eye gaze fixation time is longer when participants viewed images with 
authentic titles (i.e., the actual titles of the works) than with no titles, and also than when 
they were asked to generate their own titles (Kapoula, Daunys, Herbez & Yang, 2009). 
Eye gaze fixation time was also the measure of understanding used by Kapoula, 
Daunys, Herbez & Yang (2009). Participants were shown three cubist paintings varying 
in levels of abstraction: an image containing abstract forms accompanied by high density 
fragments of limbs and faces, an image containing arbitrary fragments roughly 
resembling a person or object (i.e., alarm clock), and an image containing simple forms 
and cylinders. Paintings were presented in three conditions: without a title, without a title 
but in which participants were asked to invent one, and with the actual title. Fixation 
duration was higher in the actual title condition than in the no title condition. When 
participants viewed paintings along with their actual titles, their eyes were rapidly drawn 
to the fragments resembling objects. For example, when given the title Alarm Clock, gaze 
was immediately drawn to the fragments resembling an alarm clock. When they viewed 
untitled paintings, participants took longer to fix their gaze, and they spent more time 
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scanning the artwork. Unlike the studies reviewed earlier, this study did not measure 
participants’ level of liking or level of understanding when responding to artworks. Thus, 
titles shape where we look in a painting, and this may affect actual understanding of the 
work. 
Descriptions of artworks.  A working hypothesis for many researchers is that the 
understanding of an artwork’s message leads to an enjoyable aesthetic experience 
(Russell, 2003). However, as reviewed above, studies have shown that titles do not 
increase level of hedonic value (Leder et al., 2005; Russell & Milne, 1997). Perhaps this 
is because the meaning in a painting could already be very apparent (and thus the level of 
enjoyment already high) and a title adds little to the enjoyment of the work (Russell, 
2003). Thus Russell (2003) examined how additional contextual information above and 
beyond a title—descriptions of the artworks—affect a viewer’s experience by helping the 
viewer to understand the artists’ intention for the artwork. 
Russell (2003) tested the hypothesis that informative descriptions of a work 
increase a viewer’s understanding of that work, and that this increase in understanding 
would result in an increase in enjoyment. Participants rated their level of understanding 
and enjoyment of 12 abstract and semi-abstract paintings. Paintings appeared in three 
conditions: no title, title plus artist’s name, title plus artist’s name and a description. The 
descriptions were compiled by the researcher from textbook and internet resources and 
were aimed at facilitating the viewer’s understanding of the artwork. For example, for a 
painting by Yves Tanguy called “Shadow Country” (1927), the description read: 
Tanguy was a French-born American Surrealist who regarded himself as a ‘recording apparatus’ 
for the voice of the unconscious mind. His imagery is highly distinctive, featuring half-marine and 
half-lunar landscapes in which amorphous, nameless objects, and imaginary life-forms proliferate 
in a spectral dream-space.  
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There was a marginal main effect of condition on level of understanding: not surprisingly, 
with more information provided, level of perceived understanding increased. Note 
however that this study examined perceived understanding only, not actual understanding. 
It is difficult to determine how to measure “understanding” objectively because 
understanding an artwork can mean something different to each individual. For one 
person, understanding an artwork could mean that the image reminds her of a personal 
experience. For another, understanding an artwork could mean interpreting the artist’s 
intention.  It should be noted that while condition affected perceived understanding, 
condition had no effect on level of pleasingness. Other factors may contribute to the level 
of pleasingness besides level of understanding. 
 
The Influence of Indirect Contextual Information on Response to Works of Art 
We also use indirect information to reason about an artwork – information about 
the artist rather than direct information about the works. Information about who an artist 
is, or about how the artist created the work of art is information that cannot be seen. I 
refer to this kind of context as indirect.   
We care about who made an artwork because works of art of all societies express 
personal character and feeling specific to an individual mind (Dutton, 2003). Evaluating 
an art object involves engaging with a human agent—the artist. In the book Search for 
the Real, abstract expressionist artist Hans Hoffman claims that “Arrangement is not art” 
(Hoffman, 1948, p. 46).  Hoffman states that the space known as the paper or canvas is a 
pictorial space with a life of its own (Hoffman, 1948). Several factors make up this 
space—the most obvious factors are the visual properties. But the life of the creative 
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mind (the artist) is also part of the pictorial space. The artist directly constructs the space: 
it is the artist’s design and the artist’s thoughts on the paper. But the artist becomes an 
indirect part of the viewer’s experience because the viewer knows that the artist is behind 
the artwork. To understand what the artist “means,” we look to the artistic process behind 
the work—was it original, copied, accidental, labored over, what style of art was the artist 
reacting against, what was the artist thinking and feeling as she created the work, etc. 
(Dutton, 2009).  
Dutton (1979, 2009) argues that what gives rise to the consideration of the mental 
state of the artist is the concept of performance. Aesthetic appreciation is “inherently 
connected with the experience of making,” and understanding of a work involves not 
only responding to the physical properties of the work but also comprehending the nature 
of the achievement that a work represents (Dewey, 1934, p. 49). An artwork is the 
product of an individual mind, rather than a product manufactured by a company. The 
process of creation can be considered a performance. This performance includes the 
artist’s motive for creating the work, the artist’s level of experience, and the artist’s 
historical affiliations. We are interested in who made an artwork and when it was made in 
order to get a sense of the historical context of the artwork. For example, faced with a 
simple painting constructed of lines and geometrical forms, knowing whether that 
painting came from Dutch De Stijl Movement in the early 1900’s (a German movement 
that was created in part as a response to Cubism), or from the Minimalist Movement in 
the 1960’s (a post World War II Western movement that was created in part as a response 
to Abstract Expressionists) adds meaning to the painting. The historical ties attached to 
an object add invisible meaning beyond the material or functional worth of the object 
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(Bloom & Markson, 1998; Gelman & Ebeling, 1998). And knowing the historical context 
of a painting may make it easier to connect “the experience of making” (i.e., the 
performance) to the artwork. Where an artwork came from becomes part of the 
performance of the artist, and thus part of the viewing experience. All of these aspects 
contribute to a unique performance behind the each work. 
In what follows I review research on how these aspects (origin, authenticity, and 
magical contagion [as influenced by the morality of the artist and of the image contents]) 
affect our response to works of art. Because the research on this is scant, I draw upon 
research examining how our knowledge about the origin and authenticity of non-art, 
utilitarian objects affects our valuing of these objects, and point out how these findings 
may lead to hypotheses about how these contextual factors could shape aesthetic 
experience. 
Status. One form of indirect contextual information is a status label – that is, 
verbal information telling the viewer the status of the artist in terms of fame, skill level, 
etc.  Hawley-Dolan and Winner (2011) examined the effect of telling the viewer that the 
work of art was created by a famous artist vs. a child or an animal.  They paired strikingly 
similar pairs of abstract art made by children, monkeys and elephants with abstract 
professional artworks. In one condition images were presented unlabeled as to who the 
artist was; and in the other two conditions images either had correct labels (artist, child, 
monkey/elephant) or incorrect (e.g., reversed) labels. Adult participants with and without 
art training were asked which image they preferred and why, and which image was the 
better work of art and why. Overall participants preferred and judged as better the 
professional images over the images made by children, chimps and elephants, 
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irrespective of labeling condition. However, correct labels did elevate preferences for the 
works by professional artists for the participants without art training. These findings 
show that status information does affect preference, but only when the status information 
is correct and only for participants without art training.  
Origin: Accidental vs. intentional. There is a considerable body of work 
examining how people respond to objects based on information about the object’s origin 
(i.e., how the object was made), but most of this work examines responses to non-art 
objects (Friedman, Neary, Defeyter, & Malcolm, 2011). However, two studies have 
examined children’s sensitivity to origin when reasoning about art objects (Bloom & 
Markson, 1998; Gelman & Ebeling, 1998).  
Children are attentive to origin (often called historical path) when responding to 
human-made artifacts as well as to drawings (Bloom & Markson, 1998; Gelman & 
Ebeling, 1998). When we respond to the origin of an artwork, we overlook outward 
appearances and focus on the non-visual properties of the artwork (i.e., where it came 
from, who made it). In one experiment, 3-5-year-old children were given a series of 
artifacts and artworks (e.g., knife, toy, painting) and were told that some were 
accidentally made and others intentionally made (Gelman & Ebeling, 1998). They were 
read a story about the process of creation and then asked, “What is this?” Children were 
more likely to use artifact names (e.g., knife) than material-based descriptions (e.g., 
plastic) when responding to objects/artworks made intentionally rather than accidentally. 
Proper names for objects/artworks were used when objects/artworks were created 
intentionally, whereas material-based names were used when objects/artworks were 
created accidentally. The authors concluded that children pay attention to how something 
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was made and where it came from when deciding how to identify it. This study did not 
examine how much children liked the objects/artworks, or how good they judged them to 
be. 
 Origin: Authentic vs. forged. Information about whether the work was forged or 
authentic has a powerful effect on the viewer’s experience of an artwork. Imagine an 
original work of art and a forgery of that work that is an identical copy. There should be 
no difference in our response to these two works. We can see no difference, and we only 
know through the word of an expert (who knows from documented history or 
microscopic examination) which image is the original and which the forgery. Still when 
told which one is the original and which the forgery, people value the original more 
(Newman & Bloom, 2011). Why is this the case?  This question has been much debated 
by philosophers (Dutton, 1979; Goodman, 1976). 
According to Dutton (1979), the reason that an original and a copy do not have 
the same aesthetic value is that forgeries are artistic crimes. They are artistic crimes 
because they are misattributions of origin. Because they are misattributions of origin, 
they are misrepresentations of achievement. Recall that for Dutton, the performance of 
the artist is important to aesthetic experience. Because forgeries are misrepresentations of 
performance, knowing that a work is a forgery fundamentally alters the aesthetic 
experience, even when there are no visible differences between the original and the 
forgery. Goodman (1976) offered another reason for why we respond differently to a 
forgery than to an original. Just knowing that a work is a forgery encourages us to look 
more closely at the forgery to try to figure out how it differs from the original.   
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Psychologists have also addressed this question. Kulka (1982) provided three 
theoretical categories of answers to the question of whether there is a difference between 
an original and a forgery: the skeptical view, the reductionist view, and the attitudinal 
view.  According to the skeptical view, two objects that do not differ in observable 
qualities cannot differ in aesthetic value.  According to the reductionist view, there is an 
aesthetic difference between an original and a forgery that can be reduced to the existing 
physical differences between them, no matter how minute.  Consistent with Dutton 
(1979) and Goodman (1976), according to the attitudinal view, it is not viewers’ actual 
ability to perceive the minute differences, but rather their belief that there are differences 
(even if they can’t see them) that affects their aesthetic judgment.  Rather than 
subscribing to one of these three particular viewpoints, Kulka underscores the need to 
discriminate between aesthetic value and artistic/art-historical value.  In his view, a 
forgery and an original have the same aesthetic value, but the forgery has no art-historical 
value. The art historical value provides context for an interpretation of the artwork. 
Experiments have been conducted to determine the factors that affect responses to 
images when viewers know that they are forged. Newman & Bloom (2011) approached 
this topic by asking people to think about duplicated art and non-art objects that were 
either created by the original maker or by someone else (an apprentice or subcontractor). 
Participants saw one of the following four scenarios:  
Art, original manufacturer: The Mill, a painting by a well-known artist named Roberts, is 
currently stored in Warehouse A. The painting is valued at $100,000. The artist agrees to 
make an exact duplicate personally. The duplicate is identical in every way. The 
duplicate is stored in Warehouse B. 
 
Art, different manufacturer: Murder of Valentinian, a painting by a well-known artist 
named Smith, is currently stored in Warehouse A. The painting is valued at $100,000. 
The artist agrees to have an apprentice create an exact duplicate. The duplicate is 
identical in every way. The duplicate is stored in Warehouse B. 
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Artifact, same manufacturer: R-TL, a prototype car by a well-known manufacturer 
named Roberts, is currently stored in Warehouse A. The automobile is valued at 
$100,000. The manufacturer agrees to make an exact duplicate. The duplicate is identical 
in every way. The duplicate is stored in Warehouse B.  
 
Artifact, different manufacturer: RI-XP, a prototype car by a wellknown manufacturer 
named Smith, is currently stored in Warehouse A. The automobile is valued at $100,000. 
The manufacturer agrees to have a subcontractor make an exact duplicate. The duplicate 
is identical in every way. The duplicate is stored in Warehouse B. 
 
Using a 9-point scale (0 = a lot less than $100,000 and 9 = a lot more than $100,000), 
participants indicated how valuable they believed the artwork/automobile to be. 
Duplicate artworks were judged as less valuable than the original artwork, but there was 
no difference in response to duplicate artifacts vs. original artifacts. Additionally, 
duplicate artworks made by the original artist were judged to be more valuable than 
duplicate works of art made by the artist’s assistant. There were no observable 
differences between duplicate automobiles made by the original manufacturer and those 
made by the subcontractor.  
These results show that origin is important when making decisions about artworks 
but not when making decisions about non-artworks. Newman and Bloom (2011) theorize 
that the authentic work is valued over the duplicate work because we know that the artist 
touched or handled the object in some way. The qualities of the artist—the maker—rub 
off on the artworks, making the objects special. These contagious qualities affect the way 
in which we respond to a work of art. 
Celebrity contagion. The properties that an artifact inherits by being touched, 
worn or handled in some way have been shown to “contaminate” our perceptions of these 
artifacts, a phenomenon referred to as “magical contagion” (Hood, 2009). Both the 
negative and positive qualities of the owner or maker of an object are perceived to “rub 
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off” (by being touched or handled) on the objects themselves, and they thereby become 
essential properties of the items, affecting how we respond to them. People refuse to wear 
a freshly laundered item of clothing after being told that a killer once wore it (Nemeroff 
& Rozin, 2000). When presented with two identical rings (one an individual’s own 
wedding ring and the other a duplicate) and asked which one they prefer to keep, people 
choose the original (Hood, 2009). And people rate items of clothing significantly more 
highly if told they belonged to celebrities with positive rather than negative reputations 
(Newman, Diesendruck, & Bloom, 2011). 
Children are also sensitive to the notion of “celebrity contagion.” Hood and 
Bloom (2008) presented children with a cup in one of two conditions: a cup that was said 
to be “special” because it was owned by a famous person (e.g., Queen Elizabeth), and a 
cup that was said to be “special” because it was made of metal (the cup was identical in 
appearance in both conditions). Children were asked to indicate with tokens how much 
they valued each cup. They offered more tokens for the cup that was special because 
Queen Elizabeth made it. The researchers reasoned that the children believed that certain 
qualities of Queen Elizabeth “rubbed off” on the cup, making it more valuable than the 
cup that was just special because of it was “made of metal.” Queen Elizabeth’s handling, 
touching and owning of the cup made it valuable and irreplaceable.  
Surprisingly we know little about the effects of magical contagion on artworks 
(Frazier, Gelman, Wilson & Hood, 2009). Art objects differ markedly from utilitarian 
objects. There is no utilitarian purpose to art objects, only an aesthetic purpose. Because 
artworks are performances by artists, it is likely that our beliefs about origin have more of 
an effect on our responses in the case of an artwork than in the case of a utilitarian object. 
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In addition, who owned the object (the person who has handled the object) is likely to be 
more important in the case of utilitarian objects, whereas who made the object is likely to 
be more important in the case of art objects.  
Moral contagion. Because a work of art is a reflection of the artist’s mind, our 
response to a work of art is likely to be influenced by what we know about the artist’s 
moral character. Do we like Wagner a little bit less because we know he was a Nazi 
sympathizer, even when we insist we can separate his art from his politics? If an artist’s 
character is reflected in the actual content of the works of art he or she creates, does that 
make it even more difficult to avoid the influence of the artist’s moral mind? In short, can 
we separate the artist’s immorality from the content of the work?   
A powerful illustration of the role of moral contagion in response to visual 
artworks can seen in a 1995 installation by Tracey Emin in the Saatchi Gallery in London. 
Emin’s installation included a warmly lit tent with an embroidered quilt laid inside. On 
first glance the installation appears to be a simple camping tent with a soft glow that 
invites further exploration perhaps by a child or by a boy scout. When approached more 
closely, patchwork lining the outer edge of the tent becomes visible indicating the dates 
“1963-1995”—curious to the viewer, but so far, uninformative. Perhaps the viewer’s first 
associations with the installation are of camp memories and of reading by the glow of a 
flashlight. But upon further investigation of the internal tent flaps, one can see a list of 
names embroidered on the sides. The viewer may still be confused, attempting to work 
out what this all means. But finally, the viewer reads the title, “Everyone I Have Ever 
Slept With 1963-1995.”   
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How does the realization that inside the tent is an embroidered list of names 
indicating every person that Emin has slept with for 32 years influence the viewer’s 
experience of the installation? The tent is no longer a play area for children, nor a 
representation of past camping trips, but rather a representational shrine to all the people 
Emin has had relations with. It is reasonable to assume that the newly acquired 
knowledge of what the tent actually represents changes how the viewer responds to the 
physical artwork directly (our literal interpretation of the work), but also changes the way 
in which we see (and perhaps judge) the artist.    
Inside the artwork, inside the tent, is a visible display of how many partners Emin 
has had. And for some this display might be offensive. But what is more offensive, that 
Emin had so many partners or that she is showing this in her installation? It is reasonable 
to assume that facts about Emin’s moral character might in fact change the way one 
views the artwork. In some cases traces of the moral character of an artist might be 
visible within an actual artwork: a list of 108 names of sexual partners displayed in a tent. 
In other cases information about the artist’s moral character might be invisible: an artist 
had 108 partners but there is no visible record of this displayed, no direct link to the 
content of the artwork (i.e., a tent with camping gear and children’s toys).  Would we 
care if an artist had 108 sexual partners and made an installation completely unrelated to 
his or her sex life? How does information about the artist’s character shape our viewing 
experience? Contextual information about the artist’s moral character might not be 
directly related to what is represented in the artwork, but might influence how we view 
the artwork. The artist, who remains invisible when we are confronted with an artwork, 
becomes indirectly (and metaphorically) visible through contextual information.  
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Another example that illustrates the concept of moral contagion can be seen in the 
1998 installation by Mike Kelley for the Renaissance Society called “Pay For Your 
Pleasure.”  Pop art-like pictures of famous great male poets, philosophers and politicians 
(e.g., Oscar Wilde, Piet Mondrian, Francis Picabia, among others) lined the walls of a 
corridor. Each portrait was accompanied by a statement made by the artist, philosopher or 
politician commenting on the similarities between the criminal mind and the artistic mind, 
i.e. the licensure of the artist to be rebellious and non-conformist. Examples of statements 
included: “Men like Benvenuto Cellini (artists) ought not be bound by laws (Pope Paul 
III);”  “A painting is a thing which requires as much cunning, rascality and viciousness as 
the perpetration of a crime (Edgar Degas); and “Imagination lies in wait as the most 
powerful enemy. Naturally raw, and enamored of absurdity, it breaks out against all 
civilizing restraints like a savage who takes delight in grimacing idols (Goethe)” 
(Renaissance Society, 1988, 
http://www.renaissancesociety.org/site/Exhibitions/Images.Mike-Kelley-Three-Projects-
Half-a-Man-From-My-Institution-to-Yours-and-Pay-for-Your-Pleasure.110.2373.html). 
The show included one painting at the very end of the hallway with no quote—a self-
portrait by John Wayne Gacy, a child rapist and murderer. At the end of a show that 
seemed to honor the exciting criminality of the creative mind was an actual criminal’s 
artwork made by a man awaiting his death sentence (Knight, 1992). The connotation of 
heroism, of the rebellious artist, disappears and suddenly the viewer is faced not just with 
the notion of rebellion and art, but with an artist who was an actual killer.  
One of Kelley’s many goals in showing this work was to encourage the viewer to 
rethink the romanticism attached to the rebel artist status (Knight, 1992). Another one of 
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his goals might have been to encourage the viewer to consider not only the contribution 
that these great men made to their fields, but also the minds behind the crafts. Kelley 
encourages the viewer to examine the artist’s historical and moral affiliations when 
considering his craft, not just the artist’s end product. One of the most important 
questions this installation raises is why we care about who made an artwork if we are 
merely looking at the visible end product of the artist’s work. And if information about 
the artist is not directly related to the physical image, how is it that such information 
affects how we view and respond to the work?   
An important factor to consider regarding magical contagion is that there are both 
positive and negative consequences of contagion. People recoil from the idea of wearing 
a sweater worn by a killer, but jump at the opportunity to wear one worn by George 
Clooney (Hood, 2009). The negative qualities of the killer seem to rub off on the sweater, 
as do the positive qualities associated with Clooney. No research has yet examined 
whether the positive vs. negative moral character of the artist affects our experience of 
works made by that artist.  
In the example of Emin’s 1995 work mentioned above, the fact that the artist slept 
with so many people may in some way have sullied the viewer’s perception of the 
installation. But is it that the content of the work is viewed as unsavory, or that the artist 
is viewed as having an unsavory character? If she is judged immoral, her character may 
literally “contaminate” the work of art. Or there could be a combination of both the 
artist’s immorality and the immorality of the content of the artwork (because the artist’s 
encounters are literally laid before the eye for us to judge). No research has examined this 
and thus no empirical evidence supports one conclusion or another, but in this case it is 
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reasonable to assume that the negative reaction would be a combined response to both 
Emin’s moral character and the visible depiction within the installation. In this example 
the visible (i.e., list of sexual encounters) and the non-visible (i.e., the actual sexual 
encounters) are so thoroughly intertwined that one cannot determine the cause of an 
aversive reaction. 
There are three ways in which negative moral information associated with the 
artist could “contaminate” a viewer’s response to an artwork. First, an artist may be 
known to be an immoral person, but the content of his artworks is unrelated to his 
immorality. Hitler was an artist in Vienna in the early 1900s (Schjeldahl, 2002) but his 
works tell us nothing about his monstrous war crimes. Alternatively, an artist may be 
known to be an immoral person and this may be directly reflected in the content of his 
artworks. Serial murderer John Wayne Gacy was an artist, and his works actually 
depicted his crimes. Gacy’s painting of a clown (“Pogo the Clown”) was particularly 
controversial because he often played a clown at events to prey on young children. And 
lastly, a person could be a perfectly moral person but depict immorality within his or her 
artwork (e.g., Eustache Le Sueur’s Rape of Tamar).  
If an artist is known to have an unsavory moral character, how much does this 
knowledge contaminate our experience of artworks produced by this artist? Works by 
both Hitler and Gacy been auctioned for thousands of dollars to buyers whose goal was to 
buy them so they could then destroy them 
(http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/05/13/serial.killer.art/index.html?hpt=C2, accessed 
9/12/12).  Is it enough to know that an artist was a criminal to make us shudder at his 
works? How much worse is it for the viewer if the works actually have a visible 
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connection to the artist’s crimes? How much does the intention behind the artist’s 
immoral depiction matter? Picture an artist who may not be known to be an immoral 
person, who may not depict immoral scenes, but whose works fulfill immoral fantasies. 
For example, imagine an artist who paints images of nude children because he has 
inappropriate fantasies about children. If we knew this fact would it affect our aesthetic 
response, or could we separate our view of the artist’s character from our judgment of his 
artworks?    
To conclude, little is known about how the perceived morality of the artist bleeds 
into our experience of the art produced by that artist.  This is the issue addressed by the 
two studies reported in the following chapters. 
The Moral vs. Artistic Side of the Artist’s Mind 
Before turning to the studies, I first review research on the relationship between 
the moral and aesthetic domain, the development of moral reasoning, and the 
development of theory of mind, and differences between liking and evaluative responses 
to works of art. 
The moral domain and the aesthetic domain. Little research has examined the 
relationship between how we reason about the moral and the aesthetic domain. But we do 
know that theory of mind plays an integral role in both ethical and aesthetic evaluations. 
We are interested in ‘who painted the brushstrokes, and were they intentional?’ just as we 
are interested in ‘who poisoned X, and was it intentional? In recent work by Hawley-
Dolan and Young (submitted) we investigated the role of theory of mind in the aesthetic 
and ethical domain, specifically examining the role of subjective evaluations vs. objective 
evaluations. Participants were given moral stories about moral deeds in which the motive 
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was either accidentally or intentionally good or bad. Participants were also given 
paintings in which the motive for painting the image was either accidental or intentional 
with the image being aesthetically “good” or “bad”. Participants were asked a question 
assessing liking for the image or the moral agent, and one assessing evaluative judgment 
for the image or moral agent. The results showed that intent (i.e., intentional vs. 
accidental) matters more for objective (evaluative) than subjective (liking) judgments for 
both the art and moral domains. And intent matters more for the moral than the aesthetic 
domain, perhaps because the moral domain is more objective (moral codes are seen as 
permanent and non-negotiable [Turiel, 1979]) than the aesthetic domain. Aesthetic 
judgments are likely more subjective than are moral ones, and aesthetic judgments have 
been likened to gustatory taste [Parsons, 1987]). Consistent with Hawley-Dolan and 
Young (submitted), Hawley-Dolan and Winner (2011) showed that judgments of value in 
the aesthetic domain are sensitive to perceived levels of intentionality. While research 
shows that intent matters more in the moral domain than in the aesthetic domain, little is 
known about how morality influences the domain of aesthetics. 
The development of morality. Jean Piaget’s and Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
foundational theories of moral development form the basis for what we know about how 
children reason in the domain of morality. In what follows I will provide a brief review 
on 1) what is known about how children develop moral reasoning, and 2) current research 
on moral reasoning in adults and children.  
Jean Piaget. Jean Piaget’s theory of moral development involved two key 
principles: 1) that moral development occurs in stages, and 2) that moral reasoning is 
constructed by the individual in cooperation with his or her peers (e.g., that it is not 
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simply a process of learning cultural expectations) (Piaget, 1965).  Piaget begins his 
description of the stages of moral development through the lens of children’s 
understanding of games (Piaget, 1965).  
Piaget argued that all morality consists of a system of rules. In order to understand 
how children learn to respect these rules, and allow for changes to the rules, he studied 
games, because the rules of games are passed on and elaborated upon by children rather 
than adults. Piaget observed two different kinds of moralities when observing the games. 
And from his observations he described two stages of moral development: children under 
the age of nine to ten think about moral rules as absolute and fixed; children older than 
this believe rules to be more changeable—what Piaget refers to as relativistic view. While 
younger children believe that rules are unchangeable, sacred and “passed down by God,” 
older children believe that society can collectively change a rule. In the game of marbles, 
Piaget describes young children as viewing the rules as sacred and unchangeable but in 
actuality they put these rules into practice in a systematic way playing according to their 
own understanding (Piaget, 1932/1965). Piaget explains that in older children, 
cooperation facilitates an understanding of rules based on mutual agreement. A 7-year-
old child playing marbles may be subject to the same rule as the 12-year-old child but the 
7-year-old views the rule as unchangeable and the 12 year-old views it as valid only after 
it has been mutually agreed upon (Piaget, 1932/1965).  
Moral thinking in young children (under the age of 9-10-years-old) is based on 
consequences (i.e., preintentional). Moral thinking in older children (over the age of 10-
years-old) is based on judgments of intentions (intentional)—they take motive into 
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account. For example, dropping 6 plates by accident is just as bad as dropping on purpose 
for the younger children in the preintentional way of thinking.  
Lawrence Kohlberg. Lawrence Kohlberg adapted Piaget’s theory of moral 
development. Kohlberg’s theory consisted of six developmental stages that can be 
grouped into three levels: pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional 
(Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). Two stages comprise each level and no stage can be skipped. 
Each level provides a necessary building block for the next but also comprises a more 
comprehensive approach than the previous stage.  
The Preconventional level of moral reasoning is common in children (although it 
is important to note that Kohlberg claims that adults can be at this level of reasoning) 
(Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). This level comprises two stages that are primarily associated 
with ego-centrism—a child in the preconventional level is sensitive to society’s 
conventions of right and wrong but interprets these labels in terms of their direct external 
consequences (e.g., punishment, reward). The child focuses on the direct consequences 
that actions elicit. In stage one, the punishment and obedience orientation, the physical 
consequences of the action determine the “rightness” or “wrongness” of something. In 
stage two, the instrumental relativist orientation, the mentality of “you scratch my back, 
I’ll scratch yours” is adopted (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). Moral right is described as what 
satisfies one’s own needs, and fairness and reciprocity are defined in terms of physical 
outcomes (rather than by justice or loyalty). There is a lack of recognition that another’s 
point of view might be different from one’s own, and a lack of interest in others’ needs.   
The Conventional level typically applies to adolescents and adults. In the 
Conventional level the priority of the individual is to maintain the expectations of the 
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family, group or nation (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). This is a valued priority regardless of 
the immediate consequences. In other words, loyalty to social order and supporting and 
identifying with members of the persons involved in your family, group or nation are 
valuable in their own right. In Stage 3, the interpersonal concordance or “good boy—nice 
girl” orientation, behavior that is good or which pleases others earns approval. In Stage 4, 
the “law and order” orientation, people are oriented towards authority (Kohlberg & Hersh, 
1977). Right behavior is considered behavior that consists of doing one’s “duty” and 
showing respect for authority.  
At the Postconventional (also known as the autonomous or principled level) the 
effort to define moral principles and values goes beyond self-gratification and beyond 
obedience to authority (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). Stage 5, the social-contract legalistic 
orientation, is influenced by utilitarian judgments. Individuals in this stage define right 
action and individual rights by standards that have been agreed upon by what is best for 
society. There is an emphasis on the law. In Stage 6, the universal ethical principal 
orientation, people believe in universal principles of justice, reciprocity and equality of 
human rights. People define “right” as the “decision of conscience in accord with self-
chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and 
consistency” (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977, p. 55).  
Piaget and Kohlberg are just two examples of many that demonstrate how 
research in the moral domain focuses on the measurable repercussions of moral violations  
(Blair, 1995; Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 2011; Killen & Smetana, 2006; 
Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932/1965; Turiel, 1983; Wainryb, 1991). Research in the 
domain of moral cognition has shown that moral codes are often perceived as universal 
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across time and space and non-negotiable (Turiel, 1979) as well as highly sensitive to 
information about agents’ intent (e.g., Cushman, 2008). Moral judgments depend on 
mental state inferences: people assign more blame for intentionally versus accidentally 
harmful actions and more praise for intentionally versus accidentally helpful actions 
(Cushman, 2008; Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003). Research has also uncovered 
individual differences in “moral objectivism” versus “moral subjectivism.” Some people 
are “moral objectivists,” taking ethical beliefs to express objective factual truths, while 
others are “moral subjectivists”, treating moral values more like subjective preferences 
(Goodwin & Darley, 2008; Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; Sarkissian, Park, Tien, 
Wright & Knobe, 2011). Another body of work examines behaviors that focus on 
violations of “purity” (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  
Examples of purity-based moral transgressions are alterations of nature or the 
body. In some instances these alterations (such as altering sexual organs) are said to be 
immoral because they violate a natural order (Graham et al., 2011; Guerra & Giner-
Sorolla, 2010; Jensen, 1998; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Shweder et al., 1997). 
And in other cases the purity violation may be seen as immoral because it is intuitively 
and physically disgusting (e.g., incest) (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; 
Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009; Kelly, 
2011; Rozin, Haidt, & Fincher, 2009; Rozin et al., 1999). There is little experimental 
research on children’s moral responses to purity violations. Recent work by Rottman and 
Keleman (2012) shows that children are able to form new moral beliefs about seemingly 
harmless behaviors. Children were shown various novel behaviors from aliens on a 
pretend planet (i.e., aliens who stuck berries on their spikes). The children who were 
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presented with cues that the behavior was both “disgusting and unnatural” said that the 
novel behaviors were morally “wrong” more often than children in the control condition. 
While Piaget (1932) and Kolhberg (1969) focused on harm violations, this new work 
shows that children also view purity violations as immoral and do not need to “reflect” on 
outcomes when making a moral evaluation about a purity violation (Rottman & Keleman, 
2012).  
The development of theory of mind. Mental states matter across a number of 
contexts, including moral judgment (considering the helpful or harmful intentions of the 
moral agent) (e.g., Cushman, 2008) and in artistic evaluation (considering what the artist 
planned or intended for the artwork) (e.g., Bloom, 2004). Theory of mind is defined as 
coming to understand one’s own mind and other’s minds (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 
2001). We look to people as intentional agents trying to understand their underlying 
beliefs and desires behind their thoughts and actions. The study of theory of mind (e.g., 
the capability to attribute knowledge and mental states to others) as it applies to the first 
years of life is well researched (Astington & Dack, 2008; Astington & Hughes, 2011; 
Flavell & Miller, 1998). In what follows I will briefly outline the development of theory 
of mind throughout the first five years of life. 
Infants. Some researchers claim that the emergence of theory of mind can be seen 
with infants as young as 9-15 months in their ability to engage in joint attention 
(Carpenter, Nagell, Tomasello, Butterworth, & Moore, 1998). Onishi and Baillargeon 
(2005) found that children as young as 15 months base their predictions of a target’s 
behavior on their implicit understanding of the target’s false belief. And infants between 
12-18 months use self-experience as a framework to understand others’ visual perception 
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(Meltzoff & Brooks, 2008). Infants whose views were obstructed by blindfolds were less 
likely to follow a blindfolded adult’s gaze that turned towards an object than both infants 
who merely touched the blindfold and those who were partially blindfolded (but were 
able to see) (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2008).   
Preschool and toddler years. Observations of pretend play reveal that by the age 
of 2 children show awareness that thoughts within the mind differ from things in the 
world (Kavanaugh, 2006). When pretending a block is a car toddlers show that they can 
distinguish between the object (e.g., the block) and the representation of the object as a 
car (Kavanaugh, 2006). At this age children also understand that there is a difference 
between what they want and want another person wants (Meltzoff, Gopnik, & Repacholi, 
199). A more advanced understanding ‘that thoughts within the mind are separate from 
reality’ is the realization that ‘beliefs’ are representations of an external reality and that 
these representations can be false (Perner, 1991). This is most commonly known as “false 
belief” and emerges in explicit form between the ages of three and four (Gopnick & 
Astington, 1988; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This is one of the most widely explored 
avenues in theory of mind. A common experiment is one in which a child is shown a 
candy box that would appear to contain candy but in fact contains pencils. When asked 
what she thinks her friend would think is in the box before the friend was able to look 
inside the 3-year-old will say that her friend will know pencils are inside while a 4-year-
old will say that his friend will think candy is inside (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). 
Three-year-olds do not remember that their own belief has changed after they looked 
inside the box (Gopnik & Astington, 1988). Four and five-year-olds understand the 
difference between appearance and reality.  
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Middle childhood into adolescence. By ages seven or eight, children have a more 
complex understanding of theory of mind called “interpretive theory of mind” 
(Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). Interpretive theory of mind occurs when children 
understand that two people can have different interpretations of reality (an understanding 
of subjectivity). Children who have advanced to an understanding of interpretative theory 
of mind must now comprehend that two people can have different opinions or responses 
to reality (e.g., actual stimuli) (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). For instance, one child 
might interpret a drawing of a circle as a clock but is able to understand that to another 
child it might appear to be a ball.  
Some psychologists assume that the development of theory of mind stops around 
age eight as children begin to reach ceiling in their performances on false belief tasks 
(Chandler, 1987). But a more current theory is that theory of mind continues to develop 
in later adolescence and adulthood becoming a more multidimensional ability to mind 
read (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). Only a handful of studies have examined the development 
of theory of mind past adolescence (Abell, Happe & Frith, 2000; Choudhury, Blakemore 
& Charman, 2006).  
Predictors of theory of mind ability. Other research examines predictors of theory 
of mind ability (predictors other than the primary predictor, which is age (Sabbagh & 
Seamans, 2008). There are many factors that influence the rate of typical development of 
theory of mind.  For instance, research shows that earlier mental state awareness is 
associated with the extent to which mothers talk about feelings and thoughts (Ruffman, 
Slade, & Crowe, 2002); and that children who have siblings develop theory of mind more 
quickly than those who do not (Ruffman, Perner, & Parkin, 1999). Research also shows 
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that engaging in pretend play more frequently (Youngblade & Dunn, 1995), engaging in 
acting classes (Goldstein & Winner, 2010) and reading storybooks (de Rosnay & Hughes, 
2006), all stimulate the development of theory of mind skills.  
 Disabilities are related to deficiencies in theory of mind. People with head 
injuries (Dennis, Purvis, Barnse, Wilkinson & Winner, 2001), paranoia (Craig, Hatton, 
Craig & Bentall, 2004) and those with autism or Asperger’s syndrome (Baron-Cohen, 
Jollifee, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997) have a more difficult time with some of the 
subtleties of theory of mind tasks.  High-functioning people with autism lack skills in 
mind reading abilities (Baron-Cohen et. al., 1997). Factors such as language ability 
(Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007) and cognitive abilities (executive function) that 
control and regulate behavior influence the rate of development (Milligan, Astington, & 
Dack, 2007; Moses & Tahiroglu, 2010). And how well children function in social 
environments is directly correlated with theory of mind (Liddle & Nettle, 2006).  
Research shows that children with a more developed theory of mind are more easily able 
to communicate with friends (Dunn, 1996), more socially competent (Astington, 2003; 
Gleason, Jensen-Campbell & Ickes, 2009) and report to be happier with friends 
(Astington, 2003). 
  *   *   *   * 
The goal of my dissertation was to examine through two lenses the role of 
contagion in children’s and adults’ liking and evaluations of works of art.  In the first 
study reported here, I examined the role of contagion (positive and negative) through the 
lens of owning vs. making. By examining the influence of contagion on the liking of (e.g., 
preference for) utilitarian objects and artworks that are believed to have been made vs. 
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owned by morally bad[good] people, I tested the hypothesis that owning leads to the 
perception of contagion for utilitarian objects, while making leads to the perception of 
contagion for artworks. The moral character of the owner was expected to seep into the 
liking of a utilitarian object because of the contagious effects of physical contact: an 
object is held and touched by its owner. The moral character of the artist was expected to 
seep into the liking of an artwork because of the contagious effects of making when it 
comes to art: an artist expresses his or her mind in a work, and thus if the mind is 
perceived as negative, the artwork should be seen as negative. 
In the second study reported here, I examined the effect of the artist’s character 
(positive vs. negative) on response to artworks when the content of the work was related 
vs. unrelated to the artist’s character. In this study I examined two potentially 
independent kinds of aesthetic response:  how much we like a work of art, and how good 
we judge the work to be. 
These two studies tested the hypothesis that invisible properties (i.e., the moral 
character of the artist) can affect our response to works of art as if they were visible 
properties (i.e., a part of what we see).  
Concluding thoughts and general predictions. As Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg 
(1969) suggested, young children may judge morality by consequences. However, 
children may also be able to make moral judgments based on other aspects besides 
consequences (Rottman & Keleman, 2012). When responding to an artwork that is 
associated with a morally good or morally bad artist, people can respond to the moral or 
the artistic mind of the artist. The moral mind of the artist is reflected in the artist’s moral 
behavior. The artistic mind of the artist is reflected in the structure, composition and 
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aesthetic qualities of the artwork. The current studies examine how much the artist’s 
moral intentions influence our opinions of the artwork he or she created. Because of the 
strength of the effects of magical contagion (Hood, 2009) and the notion that the artist’s 
mind is inherently tied with the experience of making (Dutton, 2004), it was 
hypothesized that adults as well as children are unable to separate beliefs about the 
artist’s moral mind from responses to the artworks created by that artist. Children were 
expected to be more affected than adults: they were expected to focus more on the moral 
mind of the artist than do adults. And it was also expected that it should be most difficult 
to separate the moral from the artistic when the content of a work of is related to the 
artist’s moral character. Finally, these contagion effects should be stronger when people 
think about how much they like a work of art than when they think about how good a 
work of art is. Liking is more subjective and emotional and thus is predicted to be more 
vulnerable to the effects of moral contagion than will be evaluative judgments.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
STUDY 1 
Moral Contagion: Responses to Art and Utilitarian Objects Owned vs. Made by Morally 
Good vs. Bad People.  
Study 1 examined the effects in both children and adults of moral contagion on 
liking responses to artworks as compared to liking responses to objects that are utilitarian 
(i.e., not works of art). Items were described as having been either made or owned by 
people of either positive or negative moral character. The kind of response that was 
measured was how much people liked each artwork or utilitarian object. 
There is no objective reason why knowing who made or who owned an item 
should influence how much we like that item if we are responding only to the objective 
physical properties of that item. But given what we know about the effects of moral 
contagion on utilitarian objects, it seems likely that beliefs about the moral character of 
the maker of a work of art should not be entirely separable from our immediate response 
to that work of art. Whether these responses are stronger for artworks than utilitarian 
objects was one question examined here. Whether these responses are stronger in 
response to beliefs about the maker rather than the owner of a work of art, and the owner 
rather than the maker of a utilitarian object was also examined. And finally, whether 
these responses are as strong in young children as in adults was explored.   
Method 
Participants 
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Adult participants. Forty undergraduate students who were recruited through 
Sona Systems at Boston College participated (Mage = 19.5; Males = 9, Females = 31). 
They received one credit for their participation.  
Child participants. Twenty-three 4-5-year-olds (Mage = 4.6; Males = 10, 
Females = 13) and twenty 7-8-year-olds (Mage = 7.3; Males = 7, Females = 13) 
participated. Children were recruited from Walnut Park Montessori, the Museum of 
Science in Boston, and the Boston Children’s Museum. Participants received stickers and 
a certificate for participation.  
Materials 
Artist Steve Hawley was commissioned to make twelve abstract non-
representational artworks. Images were non-representational. Twelve utilitarian objects 
(actual objects, not images of these objects) were collected (for a full list of utilitarian 
objects and artworks see Appendix 1).  
Procedure 
Each adult participant was tested individually in a testing room in the Arts and 
Mind Lab at Boston College. An experimenter and research assistant tested each 
participant. The participant was given a response booklet and told a cover story about the 
research assistant. The researcher was introduced as a member from a local history 
society in Boston. The participant was told the following: “This is [Name], s/he is from a 
local historical society here in Boston. S/he is going to be helping us today. Each item 
that [Name] brought has a historical significance that I will be telling you about. You are 
going to help us by rating each item based on a question we ask you. We need these 
ratings as baseline data for a project we are conducting with children.” The participant 
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was then presented with each object or artwork and was read a vignette about whether the 
object was made or owned by a person who had committed good vs. bad deeds—for 
example,  “This was owned by a serial rapist who was responsible for the rape of 13 
women.” Appendix 2 presents the full list of vignettes used for the adults. In order to 
avoid confusion that the objects might be misidentified as ‘artworks’ the subjects were 
told that, “all of the objects were meant as objects not artworks, and all of the artworks 
were meant as artworks not objects”.  
Each child participant was tested individually either at Walnut Park Montessori, at 
the Museum of Science Living Laboratory or at the Boston Children’s Museum. First, 
each child was shown the array of objects or artworks and told that all of the objects were 
either made or owned by really special people who did either really good/nice things or 
really bad/mean things. The child was then presented with each object or artwork and 
was told that the object was made or owned by a person who was nice and committed 
good deeds vs. a person who was mean and committed bad deeds. Unlike adults, children 
were not read a story relating to the person’s moral character. In order to make sure 
children were aware that the objects were not meant as artworks we asked each child the 
following questions: “What do we do with things like this [holding up a jump rope]?” 
And, “What do we do with things like this [holding up an artwork]?” If children, did not 
spontaneously say that objects were for playing with/using, and that artworks were for 
hanging up/looking at then the experimenter reinforced this with each child.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in which they saw 
24 items (both artworks and objects). In each of the four conditions ownership and 
morality were crossed to yield:  
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     12 art items in each of the following four categories: 
• Art-Made-Bad 
• Art-Made-Good 
• Art-Owned-Bad 
• Art-Owned-Good 
And, 12 object items in each of the following four categories: 
• Object-Made-Bad 
• Object -Made-Good 
• Object -Owned-Bad 
• Object -Owned-Good 
After viewing each item and hearing whether it was owned or made by a nice or mean 
person, participants were shown a 7 point Likert scale (1= Not at all, 7 = Very much) 
which was explained to them. They were asked respond orally to a liking question (How 
much do you like this item?) and to justify their response (Why?).  Sessions in which 
participants (adults or children’s guardians) consented were either video- or audio-
recorded. 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were examined. 
H1 Moral contagion: Moral character should affect liking ratings. Both 
artworks and utilitarian objects, regardless of origin (i.e., whether they were 
owned or made) that are associated with people described negatively should 
be rated lower than those associated with people described positively.  Such a 
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finding would demonstrate moral contagion, and would demonstrate that 
moral goodness/badness affects how much we like both artworks and objects.  
H2: Stronger moral contagion for owned than made utilitarian objects; 
stronger moral contagion for made than owned artworks, or equal moral 
contagion for owned and made artworks.   A 3-way interaction, moral 
character (good, bad) x kind of object (art, object) x origin (owned, made) was 
predicted. For utilitarian objects, owning should matter more than making. 
This is because a utilitarian object is often manufactured rather than made by 
hand, and thus should be perceived as more “contaminated” by how it has 
been handled as it has been used, rather than by the process by which it was 
made. For artworks, there are two competing possibilities. On the one hand, 
making may matter more than owning given the assumption that artists infuse 
their personal selves into what they make (Dutton, 2004). That is, artworks are 
not only touched and handled in the process of making, but they also reflect 
the artist’s self (making their good or bad character more contagious than if it 
were merely owned). On the other hand, if contagion is primarily a 
consequence of imagined handling, it is possible that we respond no 
differently to information about who made vs. owned the artwork. After a 
work of art is completed it is left to be looked at and is rarely handled again 
after it is created. Its purpose is just to be looked at. Research on the construct 
of contagion often evaluates how much the participant wants to engage with 
the object that has been contaminated (i.e., would you wear it? would you use 
it?) After an artwork is made there is little physical contact with it:  it simply 
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hangs on the wall. Thus, because artworks are made to be looked at and not 
touched, it could be that when comparing artworks that are owned vs. made 
there is no difference between whether a morally bad person makes or owns 
an artwork. 
 
With respect to age, I included both younger and older children (4-5-year-
olds and 7-8-year-olds) to test the hypothesis that moral contagion effects are 
as strong for preschoolers as they are for older children and adults. Hence I 
did not expect developmental changes.  
 
Results 
The most important results of Study 1 are summarized in Table 1.  
A 4-way ANOVA, origin (made, owned) x kind (art, non-art) x moral character 
(nice, mean) x age (adults, 4-5-year-olds, 7-8-year-olds), was performed on liking ratings.  
Hypothesis 1. A main effect of moral character (F (1, 79) = 86.79, MSE = 417.80, 
p < .001) supported Hypothesis 1 (see Figure 1). Across all age groups, objects and 
artworks associated with a negative moral character were liked less (4-5yrs: Mmean= 3.91, 
7-8yrs: Mmean = 3.79, adults: Mmean = 2.95) than those associated with a positive moral 
character (4-5yrs: Mnice = 5.61, 7-8yrs: Mnice = 5.29, adults: Mnice = 4.75). Thus, the 
morality of the maker/owner affects how much we like what is made or owned, 
irrespective of whether this is a work of art or a utilitarian object. And this finding holds 
for adults as well as children as young as four-years-old. 
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Hypothesis 2. Moral character interacted with kind and origin (F (1, 79) = 5.67, 
MSE = 4.34, p = .02). As predicted, for utilitarian objects, those owned by morally bad 
characters were liked significantly less (M = 3.26) than those made by morally bad 
characters (M = 3.70), (t = (1, 82) = 3.96, p < .001) (see Figure 2). However, for those 
associated with morally good people, there was no difference in ratings for those owned 
vs. made (p = .97). Contrary to prediction, however, the reverse pattern was not seen for 
artworks: there was no difference in liking for artworks made vs. owned by morally bad 
(p = .35) or morally good (p = .25) characters (see Figure 2).  
There was a three-way interaction among kind, character, and age, (F (1, 79) = 
4.11 MSE = 4.02, p = .02). Post-hoc paired sample t-tests showed that the younger 
children preferred utilitarian objects over artworks both when these were associated with 
negative moral character (Mobject = 4.44, Martwork = 3.38 respectively), (t = (1, 22) = -2.75, 
p = .01) and with positive moral characters (Mobject = 5.89, Martwork = 5.32 respectively), (t 
= (1, 22) = -2.18, p = .04) (see Figure 3). In other words, the youngest children simply 
preferred the utilitarian objects to the artworks.  Liking ratings by older children did not 
differ for objects vs. artworks associated with mean moral characters, (t = (1, 19) = -1.22, 
p = .23). However, their preference for utilitarian objects associated with positive moral 
characters (M = 5.45) was marginally greater than their preference for artworks 
associated with positive moral characters (M = 5.05), (t = (1, 19) = -1.86, p = .07). Adults 
showed an intermediate pattern: they preferred artworks to utilitarian objects (Martwork = 
6.52, Mobject = 5.29) when these were associated with negative moral characters, (t = (1, 
38) = 3.61, p = .001) (see Figure 3). However, they showed no difference in preferences 
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for objects vs. artworks associated with positive moral characters (t = (1, 39) = .662, p 
= .51).  
The three-way interaction between character, kind, and origin reported above is 
the most important finding. This interaction demonstrates that how much we like both 
artworks and utilitarian objects is affected more strongly by association with morally bad 
than morally good characters.  In the case of objects but not artworks, the negative 
influence is stronger if the objects are believed to be owned rather than made by a 
negative moral character. And finally, there were developmental differences. Four-five-
year-olds simply preferred the objects to the artworks – at least to the kinds of non-
representational art works used here.  
While adults are not able to override the effects of magical contagion entirely, 
they are more easily able to override the effects of negative magical contagion when 
responding to artworks than utilitarian objects—perhaps because the artworks have 
aesthetic properties that counteract the moral character of the artist. However, the 
artworks used here were all nonrepresentational, and it is possible that the effects of 
negative magical contagion would be stronger in the case of representational artworks—
where an association could be more easily be made between an immoral deed and the 
image depicted.  
Children 7-8 years-old fell somewhere in between the pattern of the 4-5-year-olds 
and the adults. They did not show a preference for the objects associated with negative 
moral characters, and they marginally preferred artworks to utilitarian objects associated 
with positive moral characters.   
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Additional findings that do not involve the factor of morality (and hence 
unrelated to my hypotheses). There were several significant findings that I list here but 
do not discuss because they did not involve the factor of morality. There a main effect of 
origin (F (1, 79) = 5.54, MSE = 2.82, p = .02). Made items (M = 4.45) were liked more 
than owned items (M = 4.31).There was a main effect of kind (F (1, 79) = 5.79, MSE = 
13.97, p = .01). Objects (M = 4.53) were liked more than artworks (M = 4.23). This main 
effect was further explained by an interaction between kind and age (F (1, 79) = 8.97, 
MSE = 21.63, p < .001). Children ages 4-5 liked objects significantly more than artworks 
(t = (1, 22) = -2.87, p = .009); there was no difference between liking ratings of artworks 
vs. objects for children ages 7-8 (t = (1, 19) = -1.703, p = .10); and adults liked artworks 
significantly more than objects (t = (1, 38) = 2.49, p = .01).  
Discussion 
As predicted by Hypothesis 1, there was a strong effect across age and across 
owning vs. making of moral contagion both for utilitarian as well as artworks.  The 
perceived morality of a person associated with a utilitarian object or an art object shapes 
how much we like that object. This finding holds for adults as well as children as young 
as four-years-old. The items (both utilitarian and art) were not associated with a famous 
person (as in studies by Hood [2009] and Nemerofff and Rozin [2000]); nor did either 
kind of item have any personal significance to the participants (as in Hood and Bloom 
[2008]). Nonetheless, simply believing that the person who either owned or made the 
artwork or utilitarian object was a bad or a good person affected people’s ratings of the 
items. Thus, our beliefs about the moral mind of the maker, as well as the owner, of a 
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utilitarian object as well as an artwork rubs off magically on the item and constrains our 
liking for that item. 
As predicted by Hypothesis 2, moral character interacted with kind of object and 
origin. Utilitarian objects believed to have been owned by morally bad characters were 
liked significantly less than items believed to have been made by moral bad characters. 
Thus, as predicted, for objects, owning makes moral character more contagious than does 
making. There was no effect for owning vs. making for artworks. Why did owning vs. 
making have no effect on responses to art objects?   If owning is more contagious than 
making, we can explain this finding. Owning implies handling and touching. But not in 
the case of art objects. Owned artworks are simply put on the wall to be looked at, not 
touched.     
There was also an unexpected three-way interaction between kind of object, 
character and age. The youngest children preferred objects over artworks associated with 
mean moral characters and they preferred objects over artworks associated with nice 
moral characters.  Liking ratings from older children did not differ for objects vs. 
artworks associated with mean moral characters. Their preferences for objects associated 
with nice moral characters was marginally greater than their preference for artworks 
associated with nice moral characters. Adults showed the opposite pattern when rating 
items associated with negative moral characters: they rated artworks more highly than 
objects. There was no difference in adults’ preferences for objects vs. artworks associated 
with positive moral characters.  
Together these results suggest that how much we like both artworks and utilitarian 
objects is affected more strongly by associations with morally bad than with morally 
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good characters.  In the case of utilitarian objects but not art objects, the negative 
influence is stronger if the objects are believed to be owned rather than made by a person 
of a negative moral character. And finally, there were developmental differences: four-
five-year-olds preferred the objects to the artworks used here. 
Why might children have preferred the utilitarian objects to the artworks? It is 
known that children have a difficult time understanding and appreciating non-
representational abstract artworks (Parsons, 1987). Perhaps because there was no 
representational content of the artworks the experimenter presented to them, the moral 
character associated with the artwork became the main focus or “content” of the artwork. 
Perhaps the objects were more appealing to the children; and because they could 
immediately see the functionality of the object (i.e., a toy car that they can play with), 
they focus less on the moral property associated with it.  
For adults, the difference in liking between objects and artworks was seen only 
when there was an association with a morally bad character. Artworks associated with 
morally bad characters were liked more than objects associated with morally bad 
characters. This difference between adults and young children was due to how the task 
was presented. Children were presented with an object or artwork and simply told that the 
artwork/object was made or owned by a nice person or a mean person. In contrast, adults 
were told a more elaborate story in order to make the items believable. Thus for example 
they were told that an object or artwork was owned or made by a child molester who 
molested 21 children. This made it possible to associate the object with the morally bad 
deed (e.g., a toy car might have belonged to one of the children who had been abused by 
the molester) (although this was not intentionally constructed to be as such). While adults 
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are not able to override the effects of magical contagion entirely, they are more easily 
able to override the effects of negative magical contagion when responding to abstract 
artworks versus objects—perhaps because the artworks have aesthetic properties beyond 
the stories that can be evaluated. However, the effects may be different when responding 
to representational artworks where an association could be more easily be made between 
an immoral deed and the image depicted.  
Children 7-8 years-old fell somewhere in between the pattern of the 4-5-year-olds 
and the adults. They did not show a preference for the objects associated with mean or 
nice moral characters significantly more often than the artworks. 
Research is needed to understand whether people respond to levels of magical 
contagion that are associated with the process of making an object/artwork or whether 
they are associated instead with imagined levels of handling associated with the end 
product. Moreover, research should also examine the extent to which engaging with an 
object (utilitarian or aesthetic) matters when deciding whether or not you “like” it. And 
lastly, other measures besides “liking” ratings should be examined when researching the 
effects of making and owning in magical contagion (i.e., Would you keep this? How 
likely is it that you would want to put this in your house? Etc.). 
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 2 
Does the Moral Content of the Artwork Matter?  
Study 1 showed that children as young as four years of age are sensitive to the 
effects of magical moral contagion on responses to art as well as non-art objects. Both 
adults and children preferred artworks associated with morally good than bad people. As 
discussed in the introductory chapter, there are at least two ways that morality can be 
associated with an artwork. First, the artist could be known to be immoral (or moral) but 
the artwork produced betrays no evidence in its content of the artist’s character. Second, 
the artist could be known to be immoral (or moral) and the artwork produced reveals 
evidence in its content of the artist’s character. When the artist’s moral character is 
directly reflected in the content of the works produced, does this amplify the moral 
contagion effect? This was the question addressed in Study 2.  I used representational 
works of art in Study 2 because people are more likely to be able to discern (or project) a 
link to the moral character of the maker/owner in the case of representational than 
nonrepresentational artworks. 
The stimuli used in Study 2 were paintings that were presented to participants as 
having been painted by an artist of negative or positive moral character (hereafter I refer 
to mean vs. nice artists). And the content of the paintings was described as related or 
unrelated to the artist’s character – with specifics of the content explicitly related to the 
artist’s character.    
Study 2 assessed two potentially different kinds of aesthetic responses: how much 
the work is liked (liking question), and how good the work is judged to be (evaluative 
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judgment question). The evaluative judgment question could not be asked in Study 1 
because it would have been odd to ask people to evaluate how “good” utilitarian objects 
are.  Most of the research on aesthetic response has examined what we like or prefer in 
artworks (e.g., Berylne, 1970, 1971, 1974; Eysenck, Götz, Long, Nias, & Ross, 1984; 
Fechner, 1876; Götz, Borisy, Lynn, & Eysenck, 1979; Iwawaki, Eysenck, & Götz, 1979). 
But recent evidence suggests that people’s responses are more complex and include 
evaluative processes as well (Hagtvedt, Hagtvedt, & Patrick, 2008; Hawley-Dolan & 
Winner, 2011; Leder, Belke, Oeberst, & Augustin, 2004). Information-processing and 
structural models of aesthetic appreciation differentiate between responses to art that are 
automatic and based on perception and those that are evaluative and based on cognition 
(Hagtvedt, Hagtvedt, & Patrick, 2008; Leder, Belke, Oeberst, & Augustin, 2004). 
Hawley-Dolan and Winner (2011) found that when participants indicated why they liked 
an image, their justifications for doing so were based more often on subjective criteria: 
evoked emotions, preferred colors, styles and artworks they could more easily relate to. 
In contrast, when they chose an artwork that they believed to be “the better work of art” 
their justifications were based on more objective criteria: perceptions of intentionality 
and planned compositional arrangements made by the artist. Thus it is plausible to 
assume that liking ratings (which are more subjective and based on personal associations 
and emotions) would be more sensitive to moral contagion than would be evaluative 
judgments (which are more objective and take into consideration factors of the 
composition separate from personal opinions). 
Method 
Participants 
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Adult participants. Sixty-seven undergraduate students were recruited through 
Sona Systems at Boston College (Mage = 18.9; Males = 18, Females = 49). They received 
one credit for their participation.  
Child participants. Twenty-three 4-5-year-olds (Mage = 4.43; Males = 9, 
Females = 14) and twenty-four 7-8-year-olds (Mage = 7.5; Males = 12, Females = 12) 
participated. Children were recruited from Walnut Park Montessori, the Museum of 
Science in Boston, and the Boston Children’s Museum. Participants received stickers and 
a certificate for their participation. 
Materials  
Twelve representational paintings were selected from online databases. Paintings 
selected were all representational but varied in level of realism (See Appendix 3). 
Procedure 
Adults were tested individually in a testing room in the Arts and Mind Lab at 
Boston College. Children were tested individually either at Walnut Park Montessori, the 
Museum of Science Living Laboratory or at the Boston Children’s Museum. All 
participants viewed a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation on a laptop consisting of a 
series of artworks accompanied by vignettes, presented one by one.  The images were 
approximately the same size and resolution, and each was accompanied by one of four 
kinds of vignettes: 
Vignettes describing mean artists who created images whose content was either: 
1) directly related to a negative moral deed they committed, or 
2)  was not directly related to a negative moral deed they committed.  
Vignettes describing nice artists who created images whose content was either  
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1) directly related to a positive moral deed they committed, or 
2) was not directly related to a positive moral deed they committed.   
(See below for examples; See Appendix 3 for a full list of vignettes and images) 
Example of unrelated and related image with related and unrelated nice and mean 
vignette for children and adults: 
     
Unrelated Image                                 Related Image 
(Child Mean Vignette):  
This was painted by a mean ice cream man who surprises children 
with a rotten apple when they get their ice cream to make them sad.  
 
(Child Nice Vignette):  
This was painted by a nice ice cream man who surprises children with a  
new toy when they get their ice cream to make them happy.  
 
(Adult Mean Vignette):  
A man who is an artist painted this. He owned an ice cream truck and would to go to 
local parks to sell ice cream to lure children into his truck to molest them.  
 
(Adult Nice Vignette):  
A man who is an artist painted this. He owned an ice cream truck and would surprise 
local orphanages with free ice cream on the weekends. 
 
 Participants saw both images with either the mean vignette for both related and 
unrelated images or the nice vignette for both related and unrelated images. Participants 
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were asked to make two ratings for each image on a 7-point Likert scale and to give a 
reason for each rating. The scale was explained to all participants.   
The first question was a liking question: (How much do you like this picture? 
[experimenter pointed to the picture] (1= Not at all, 7 = Very much) Why?  
The second question was an evaluative judgment question: How many stars 
would you give this picture if it were in an art contest? [experimenter pointed to the 
picture] (1 = Very Small Star, 7 = Very Big Star). Why?  
The experimenter read aloud the rating instructions only on the first slide, and 
then stated (bracketed sections include additional information given to adults in order for 
them to find the vignettes convincing): “ I am going to show you some pictures that are 
done by various artists that I have collected from a database. [For adults: We are doing a 
norming study for research with children. I need you to rate these pictures]. Each picture 
will have some information about the artists that I will read to you. I am going to ask you 
some questions and there are no right or wrong answers, just do your best”. Then the 
experimenter read aloud the vignette that accompanied each image. Participants 
responded orally and the experimenter recorded their responses. Sessions in which 
participants (adults or children’s guardians) consented were either video- or audio-
recorded.  
Hypotheses 
I first present the hypotheses for liking ratings, followed by hypotheses for evaluative 
ratings. 
Liking ratings 
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LH1 Moral contagion: As in Study 1, it was hypothesized that moral 
character would affect liking ratings, with art made by artists of positive moral 
character rated more highly than art made by artists of negative moral 
character.  Such a finding would replicate Study 1 this time with 
representational works of art, demonstrating moral contagion, and would 
demonstrate that the moral mind of the artist leaks into aesthetic preferences 
not only for nonrepresentational but also for representational images.  
LH2 Related negative moral content should affect ratings: Moral character 
was hypothesized to interact with content: images by artists of negative moral 
character should be liked less when the content is related to the negative 
character than when it is not related. However, this effect should be 
diminished or non-existent in the case of artists of positive moral character 
because negative objects are more affected by contagion than are positive 
objects (Newman, Diesendruck & Bloom, 2011). Even the youngest children 
were expected to show the same pattern of findings as the adults, revealing the 
power and immediacy of moral contagion. 
Evaluative judgments.  
JH1 Moral contagion: As predicted in LH1, it was hypothesized that moral 
character would affect evaluative judgment ratings, with art made by artists of 
positive moral character judged as better than art made by artists of negative 
moral character.  Such a finding would again demonstrate moral contagion, 
and would demonstrate that the moral mind of the artist leaks into aesthetic 
judgments of representational images.  
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JH2 Adult’s judgments should not be affected by moral contagion:  In 
contrast to what was predicted for liking ratings, no content x character 
interaction was expected for judgments. While adults should prefer mean 
artist images with unrelated content to those with related content, such images 
should not be judged as better. Such a finding would show that for evaluative 
judgments, but not preferences, adults separate the moral from the aesthetic 
and base their judgments on the aesthetic properties of the artworks.  
There are two reasons to suspect that this distinction between questions 
should occur for mean but not nice artist images. First, liking ratings are more 
subjective than evaluative judgments, and thus should be more affected by 
magical moral contagion than evaluative judgments. Second, negative objects 
have been shown to more affected by contagion than are positive objects 
(Newman, Diesendruck & Bloom, 2011). I included children in order to 
determine at what age children show a similar pattern to the predicted pattern 
of adults.  
Results 
The most important results of Study 2 are summarized in Table 1.  
Two 3-way ANOVAs were conducted on moral character (mean, nice) x content 
(related, unrelated) x age (adults, 4-5-year-olds, 7-8-year-olds), once for liking ratings 
and once for evaluation ratings.   
Liking. 
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Hypothesis L1. A significant main effect of moral character supported Hypothesis 
1, (F (1, 111) = 77.52, MSE = 176.25, p < .001).  Images made by nice artists (M = 5.63) 
were preferred to images made by mean artists (M = 4.23) (see Figure 4).  
Hypothesis L2. Content interacted with character, consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
(F (1, 111) = 6.49, MSE = 4.079, p = .01) (see Figure 5). Mean artist images with related 
moral content were liked less (M = 3.79) than mean artist images with unrelated content 
(M = 4.49) (t = (1, 113) = 5.98, p < .001). Surprisingly, the same pattern occurred for 
nice artist images: images with related content were liked less (M = 5.45) than images 
with unrelated content (M = 5.81) (t = (1, 113) = 3.19, p = .002). (A simple effects 
ANOVA revealed that there was a greater difference in how much participants disliked 
the mean related vs. the mean unrelated (p < .001) than in how much they disliked the 
nice related vs. the nice unrelated (p = .002).) Thus people preferred images in which the 
content of the moral character was unrelated to artist’s moral or immoral deed. There was 
no moral character x content x age interaction. 
Evaluative judgments. 
Hypothesis J1. A significant main effect of moral character supported Hypothesis 
1, (F (1, 111) = 92.24, MSE = 128.28, p < .001). Thus, consistent with liking findings, 
images made by nice artists (M = 5.69) were judged as better than those made by mean 
artists (M = 4.5) (See Figure 4).  
Hypothesis J2. As predicted in Hypothesis 2 there was no content x character 
interaction (p = .70).  There was a significant moral character x content x age interaction, 
(F (1, 111) = 3.36, MSE = 1.65, p = .03). Paired sample t-tests were conducted to further 
explain this result. Children ages 4-5-years-old judged mean artists’ images with 
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unrelated content as better (M = 5.08) than images with related content just as they did in 
their liking ratings (M = 4.14), (t = (1, 22) = -2.64, p = .01) and there was no differences 
in their evaluations of nice artists’ content-related or content-unrelated images, (t = (1, 
22) = -1.20, p = .24) (see Figure 6).  As predicted, there was no difference between adults’ 
evaluations of images with or without content related to the mean artist’s character, (t = 
(1, 66) = -1.51, p = .13). Adults evaluated the images of nice artists with unrelated 
content (M = 5.32) as better than those with related content (M = 4.99), (t = (1, 66) = -
3.19, p = .002) (see Figure 6). Adults enjoy images more when they are allowed to 
extrapolate their own meaning (Millis, 2001), and thus perhaps in this case adult 
participants thought that the nice images with related content lacked imagination and 
were too directly stating the artist’s intention. Surprisingly, children 7-8-years-old 
followed a similar pattern to the adults. There was no difference between 7-8-years-old’s 
evaluations of images that were related or unrelated to a mean artists’ image, (t = (1, 23) 
= -.16, p = .86). Seven-eight year olds judged the images of nice artists with unrelated 
content as marginally better (M = 5.32) than those with related content (M = 4.99), (t = (1, 
23) = -1.89, p = .07).  
Paired samples t-tests further examine the differences between participants’ liking 
ratings and evaluative judgment ratings. It was predicted that adults would make a 
distinction between the two questions, preferring mean artist images with unrelated 
content to those with related content, but not judging them as better. Adults made the 
predicted pattern of distinction between the two questions when responding to mean (but 
not nice) artist images. They preferred mean artist images with unrelated content (M = 
4.29) to those with related content (M = 3.71), (t = (1, 66) = -5.76, p < .001), but they did 
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not judge them as better (Munrelated = 4.75; Mrelated = 4.58), (t = (1, 66) = -1.51, p = .13) 
(see Figure 7). However, for nice artist images, adults like the unrelated images more and 
also deemed them as better. Unexpectedly, children 7-8-years-old made the same pattern 
of distinction between the two questions when responding to mean artist images: they 
preferred mean artist images with unrelated content (M = 4.50) to those with related 
content (M = 3.86), (t = (1, 23) = -2.05, p = .05), but did not judge them as better 
(Munrelated = 4.23; Mrelated = 4.19), (t = (1, 23) = -.16, p = .86). Seven-eight year olds did 
not make this pattern of distinction with images made by nice artists. Children 4-5-years-
old did not make the pattern of distinction with images made by mean artists 
(MeanRelatedLike vs.MeanUnrelatedLike [p = .007], MeanRelatedGood vs. 
MeanUnrelatedGood [p = .01]) or nice artists’ images. Instead they preferred the images 
by mean artists whose content was unrelated to those with related content, and still 
judged those images as being less good than those with related content.   
Thus, adults and children ages 7-8-years did not separate the content from the 
character when indicating their liking for the images—the character’s immoral deed 
sullied the image even when the deed was not visibly depicted. However when indicating 
an evaluative judgment, they were able to detach the immoral character’s deed from the 
image and judge the image based on what was depicted (rather than the character).  
Additional finding: 
For both liking (F (1, 111) = 42.69, MSE = 29.71, p < .001) and evaluative 
judgment ratings (F (1, 111) = 17.55, MSE = 11.44, p < .001) people favored paintings 
with unrelated content vs. related content. This result was most likely driven by the fact 
	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  58	  
that participants were more easily able to associate the negative moral deed to the related 
images rather than the unrelated images.  
Discussion 
Liking. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, adults as well as children as young as four 
years of age preferred images made by artists of positive moral character to images made 
artists of negative moral character.  
  The predicted character x content interaction was found. Hypothesis 2 was 
supported because each age group liked mean artist images with related moral content 
less than mean artist images with unrelated content. But surprisingly the same pattern 
occurred for the nice artist images: images with related content were liked less than 
images with unrelated content. There was, however, a greater difference in how much 
participants disliked the mean related vs. mean unrelated as compared to the nice related 
vs. the nice related. Perhaps in the nice condition when presented with images in which 
the content was unrelated participants were more easily able to interpret the artworks 
based on their own interpretations rather than have a literal depiction of story associated 
with the artwork. We know from work on titles that people prefer elaborative over 
descriptive titles (Millis, 2001). Thus perhaps when participants were given such explicit 
information that was tied to the artworks in the positive moral condition, they liked the 
images less.  
 Evaluative Judgment. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, and consistent with the 
liking findings, images made by nice artists were judged as better than those made by 
mean artists. Thus, when responding to artworks, both adults’ and children’s liking and 
	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  59	  
evaluative judgments are influenced by beliefs about the moral character of the artists 
who created the works.   
  Unlike for liking ratings, for evaluative judgments I did not expect a difference in 
ratings for related vs. unrelated content.  Results were consistent with this expectation. 
However, there was a content x character x age interaction that reveals a developmental 
difference.  
Children 4-5-years-old judged mean artists’ images with unrelated content as 
better than those with related content. This pattern mirrors that of the 4-5-year-olds’ 
liking ratings. Their evaluative judgment ratings of nice artists’ images were no different 
when the artist’s moral character was reflected in the content of the work or not.  Adults 
showed a different pattern. Unlike in their liking ratings, adults were not affected by 
whether the content was related or not in the case of negative moral character. But for 
positive moral character, adults evaluated the images with unrelated content as better than 
those with related content. Again, this could have occurred because adults enjoy images 
when they can freely extrapolate their own meaning (Millis, 2001) and thus perhaps 
adults thought that the images with related content lacked imagination and were too 
directly stating the artists’ intentions. Unexpectedly, children ages 7-8-years-old followed 
a similar pattern to adults. There was no difference between 7-8-year-olds’ evaluations of 
images that were related vs. unrelated to a mean artist’s image. And like the adults they 
judged the images of nice artists with unrelated content as better (marginally) than those 
with related content. In what follows, I more directly review the patterns of response for 
liking vs. judgment ratings across age.  
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 It was predicted that adults would make a crucial distinction between the two 
questions when responding to mean artist images with unrelated content vs. related 
content.  Preferences were expected to be more affected by personal, subjectively based 
analyses of an artwork (i.e., liking ratings) than were more objective based responses 
(evaluative judgments) (Hawley-Dolan & Winner, 2011; Leder et. al., 2004). Thus, 
because preferences are more personal (sensitive to personal taste and opinions) it was 
predicted that adults would prefer mean artist images with unrelated content. But because 
judgments of value are more objective and less personal, adults were not expected to 
judge images with unrelated content as better than those with related content.  
Adults did prefer mean artists’ unrelated images to their related images but they 
judged the two kinds of images as equally good (and they did not make this pattern of 
distinction between the two questions when responding to images made by nice artists). 
As expected, children 4-5-years-old did not make this pattern of distinction between the 
two kinds of questions—meaning they preferred the images by mean artists’ whose 
content was unrelated to those with related content and still judged those images as being 
less good than those with related content. It is reasonable to assume that their personal 
preferences took over their ability to be able to judge the works objectively. It could be 
that children ages 4-5-years-old are acting as more absolutist in that there is only one 
right, the moral right; and that the moral “right” is one in the same with “aesthetic” right.  
Unexpectedly, the 7-8-year-olds made the pattern of distinction between the two 
questions when responding to mean art images just as did the adults: they preferred mean 
art images with unrelated content to those with related content, but did not judge them as 
better. The children ages 7-8-years old were capable of disassociating the artist’s 
	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  61	  
immorality from the artwork when evaluating it as an artwork in an art contest. As did 
adults, they were able to realize that a moral “rightness” did not have to equal aesthetic 
“rightness”, and that if a painting was done by an immoral artist and depicted an immoral 
deed, it still might be an aesthetically good work of art.  
In summary, at all ages the character’s moral character shaped liking ratings even 
when the artist’s moral character was not visibly reflected in the image content. For 
liking ratings, the artist’s work could be separated more from artist’s perceived morality 
when there was no visible depiction of the deed (since participants liked the unrelated 
more than the related images). For evaluative judgment ratings, the artist’s work could be 
separated from the artist’s perceived morality because it made no difference whether the 
content was related or not. Participants were able to judge the image based on its artistic 
qualities rather than based on the morality of the artist’s mind. 
Applying the results from this study to the example of John Wayne Gacy (who 
depicted a direct link to his deeds in his artworks) vs. Hitler (who did not), one could 
reason that we would like the paintings by Hitler more than those of Gacy, but we would 
judge the artworks as equivalent in aesthetic quality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  62	  
CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Implications 
Contextual factors shape our aesthetic response and any theory of aesthetic 
response needs to consider not only how aesthetic response is shaped by the visible 
properties of an artwork, but also how our response is shaped by what we believe to be 
true about the artist—his or her character, his or her intentions, etc. Therefore, having a 
theory of mind is critical to the aesthetic experience. Indirect contextual information 
about the artist’s mind may well be more important for our aesthetic experience than is 
direct contextual information provided by titles and descriptions of paintings, although no 
comparison of these two kinds of contextual information has yet been carried out. When 
we respond to a work of visual art, we cannot help but think about the artist’s mind: the 
artist’s intention, process of creation, and character. All of these factors shape our 
experience. Research has just begun to examine these influences, and much more 
research is needed, including the study of how these mentalistic factors affect young 
children’s experience of works of art.  
 This research also elucidates the cognitive role of moral thinking when 
responding to works of art. It is well known that people recoil from the idea of wearing a 
sweater worn by a killer (Hood, 2009). But to my knowledge the research reported here is 
the first examination of how the perceived moral character of the artist affects 
interpretations of artworks by both children and adults. My studies show that adults and 
children as young as 4-years-old take the moral character of the artist into consideration 
when responding to the artistic creation. When a negative moral character is unrelated to 
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the artwork’s content, adults and children as young as four can focus on the artist’s 
creation more clearly (they like it better than when the artist’s immoral character is 
reflected in the image). And that morality is affected differentially by the cognitive roles 
associated with liking vs. evaluation. Adults and children as young as seven are able to 
judge images in which moral character is depicted within the content of the artwork as 
just as good as those without the depiction of moral character. That is, they have the 
cognitive flexibility to separate the moral from the artistic even when the moral is 
depicted within the artwork. But the youngest children studied here were unable to do 
this. Further examination of why evaluative judgments differ from liking responses and at 
what age this cognitive flexibility occurs will provide a broader understanding of 
aesthetic response. And by determining the role of morality in the aesthetic domain we 
can develop a broader picture of the role of theory of mind when evaluating works of art. 
Limitations 
 There were some limitations to these studies. 
Study 1 
 Contagion—amount of time. Study 1 did not control for amount of time that the 
owner or maker spent with each object or artwork. This factor could have influenced 
people’s ratings of the objects and or artworks.  
Sample. The sample size was small for both adults and children. There were very 
few adult males in the study.  
Likert scale. Children ages 4-5-years-old had difficulty understanding the 
variation within the scale. They used the extremes and the middle rating but rarely chose 
numbers other than 1, 4 and 7. This limitation also occurred for Study 2. 
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Vignette vs. no vignette. Adults saw the objects presented with longer vignettes 
spelling out the positive and negative deeds of the makers/owners, while children only 
saw the objects presented with indicators as to whether the maker/owner was a good/nice 
or bad/mean person. The adults were given more detailed vignettes in order to make it 
more believable that the items were associated with negative and positive moral 
characters. Therefore, it is difficult to compare responses of children and adults. It would 
be interesting to develop vignettes for children in future work and see if they 
spontaneously make associations between the artworks/objects and stories.  
No baseline ratings. It would have been good to have baseline ratings on the 
artworks and objects so that I could determine whether negative stories depressed ratings, 
positive stories boosted ratings, or whether both factors were at work. With the present 
design I cannot determine the comparative effect of negative vs. positive moral character.  
This limitation also occurred for Study 2. 
Study 2  
Sample. The sample size was small for both age groups. For the adults, there were 
mostly females and very few males.  
Ratings of the artist vs. the picture. All children had some difficulty 
understanding whether the experimenter was asking them to rate the artwork vs. the artist. 
The experimenters did point to the pictures several times however. But perhaps this was 
simply a display of a child’s inability to inhibit their judgments of the artist rather than 
the artwork. 
Within subjects design. Each participant saw two different pictures (related or 
unrelated) with the same story (either positive or negative depending on condition). The 
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participants thus responded to the same story twice, each time associated with a different 
picture. One could argue that participants may have felt as though they were rating the 
same moral character twice. However, by keeping moral valence a within subjects factor 
I reduced error associated with individual differences. And I varied the order in which the 
related vs. unrelated appeared so that participants were not always making their first 
rating of a related or unrelated picture.  
Future Directions 
Contextual information 
Research should continue to examine the role of contextual information when 
responding to an artwork. Understanding how contextual information helps or hinders 
one’s comprehension and appreciation of varying forms of artwork (realistic, abstract, 
conceptual) can give us the tools for a more comprehensive understanding of how the 
mind responds to art. Moreover, examining how children are affected by contextual 
information can provide educational programs and museum initiatives with the right 
methods to best inform and teach children about art.  
 Theory of mind. More work is needed to understand how our conception of the 
mind behind the art affects our responses to the work. As discussed in the introduction, 
we can use the properties of an artwork to reason about the artist just as we can use the 
artist to reason about the visible properties of the artwork. It would be informative to our 
understanding of aesthetic response to know how much weight we assign to the visible 
properties of the artwork vs. the invisible properties of the artist. When do we assign such 
values and why? Does it depend on the type of visual artwork? For instance, do our 
beliefs about the artist’s mind matter even more when responding to conceptual art (e.g., 
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Tracy Emin’s tent) where understanding depends so strongly on the artist’s intended 
“meaning?”. Future studies could examine whether children and adults can make two 
different ratings: one for the artist and one for the artwork, to determine the extent to 
which these ratings would differ from one another.  
Clearly theory of mind plays a role in that people are in fact sensitive to the 
intentions of the artist as a moral agent. It would be very interesting to see how people 
who lack theory of mind skills (i.e., those with autism) respond to intentionality in 
artworks. Can they read images’ visible properties and infer intentionality? Are they 
sensitive to the moral intentions of the artist? For instance, would adults with autism rate 
images associated with a negative moral artist as lower than those associated with a 
positive moral agent? Or would they be ambivalent to the subtlety of the mind of behind 
the art? 
And lastly, future studies could examine how implicit or explicit is our sensitivity 
to the mind of the artist. Were participants who were able to respond positively to the 
artwork of a negative moral character inhibiting their responses? Future work should 
examine how aware we are of our beliefs about the artist when responding to works of art.  
Morality. Little is known about how the morality of the artist affects our 
experience of art produced by said artist. More research is needed to understand the role 
of morality in art. The results of these experiments show that people are sensitive to 
morally negative content when it is associated with an immoral deed. What is unknown is 
whether people’s responses to morally negative content depend on the artist’s intentions, 
and whether an artist’s intentions when depicting morally negative content influence 
whether or not the artist’s work is seen as “art”. For example are a murder scene 
	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  67	  
photographed by a killer to document his deed and a murder scene photographed by a 
journalist who was covering the story both considered art if they are equally beautifully 
composed aesthetically? Can something morally terrible be aesthetically beautiful? An 
example of this comes from the work of photographer Sarah Charlesworth. The artist put 
together a collection of photographs called “Stills”. The black and white photographs are 
enlargements from Newspapers and are visually striking in composition. The 
photographs depict people who are either jumping from burning buildings or committing 
suicide, and neither the intention nor the outcome are apparent. Thus, one could use these 
photographs in an experiment to determine how much weight is assigned to the role of 
intentionality, morality and visual composition when responding to a work of art. 
Researchers should also examine how various kinds of moral violation (e.g., purity vs. 
harm) affect responses.  
Liking vs. evaluative judgment. Research in aesthetics should continue to 
examine the role of subjective responses vs. objective responses to art—especially 
developmental differences in subjective vs. objective responses. In the current studies, 
children as young as seven years of age were able to separate their judgments from their 
likings and actually indicated that there was no difference in their ratings of how good a 
work of art was when the content was related vs. unrelated to the artist’s character. Even 
though they disliked artworks with content that was related to immorality, they could 
judge it as just as good as an artwork with unrelated content. Researchers should examine 
whether there is a specific age at which children can separate ‘what they like’ from what 
they think is ‘good art’ or whether this understanding is flexible. Perhaps using a field 
such as art—that is seen as a more subjective field than morality (which is seen as more 
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objective)—can help children become more cognitively flexible in the domain of 
morality.    
Developmental Changes 
A developmental shift was seen in Study 2, with different performance from 4-5 
year olds and 7-8 year olds.   Children ages 7-8 performed like adults. When judging 
works of art, neither group showed a bias towards related vs. unrelated images created by 
the “immoral” artists. That is, they judged images with related vs. unrelated moral 
content as equally good. However, when it came to liking, all three age groups performed 
the same way, rating the unrelated images higher than the related ones. I propose two 
possible developmental explanations for why children ages 7-8 and adults were able to 
separate the moral mind from the artistic mind when making an evaluative judgment 
about the artworks.  
One explanation is that 7-8 year olds and adults are able to “decouple” the 
morality of the artist from the artwork more easily when making an objective judgment 
rating than when making a subjective (liking) rating. Research shows that adults are able 
to decouple an immoral act from an immoral agent (Bhattacharjee, Berman & Reed, 
2012). Participants were given scenarios about professional people who achieved a great 
deal but who also committed an immoral act (e.g., a professional hockey player who led 
his team to win the Olympic Gold medal but who was later found to have abused his 
wife) and were asked questions which measured the participants’ degree of moral 
decoupling or moral rationalization. Adults did not rationalize the negative behaviors of 
the professionals (i.e., saying that it was okay that he abused his wife because he is an 
Olympic hockey player) but instead decoupled the two characteristics (i.e., he is an 
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Olympic athlete and the information about the immoral act is separate from this fact) 
(Bhattacharjee, Berman & Reed, 2012). Furthermore, Bhattacharjee et. al., (2012) 
showed that it was more difficult to decouple the moral act from the moral agent when 
the two were directly related (i.e., Barry Bonds using steroids to better himself in baseball 
vs. Tiger Woods cheating on his wife). This same difficulty is present in the current 
studies.  
When making a liking response (a more subjective emotional response) all age 
groups had a difficult time decoupling the moral act from the artwork when the immoral 
act of the artist is visibly depicted in the artwork (as seen by the fact that all age groups’ 
liking ratings are lower for related vs. unrelated artworks). However, when making an 
objective evaluative judgment rating 7-8-year-olds and adults are able to morally 
decouple the immoral mind from the artwork even when the image is related to the 
immorality of the artist.  
Thus, one conclusion is that it is more difficult to morally decouple the immoral 
mind of the artist from the artwork when making subjective ratings of liking vs. when 
making objective evaluative judgments. Future work should examine if the same effect of 
subjective/objective distinction holds across other domains (i.e., how much do we like 
Barry Bonds or the Olympic hockey player vs. how good do we rate him as an athlete). 
Why might we see this developmental distinction between 4-5-year-olds who are 
unable to objectively decouple the immoral mind from the artwork and the 7-8-year-olds 
who are able to do so? The developmental literature on epistemological understanding 
may shed some light on why children ages 4-5 are unable to decouple the moral mind 
from the artistic mind. Kuhn, Cheney and Weinstock (2001) propose that children’s 
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understanding of where knowledge comes from—how it occurs—moves from objective 
manner of thinking (seen in children below the age of 4-5) to a subjective manner and 
then to an integration of both the objective and subjective.  
Children begin by thinking that knowledge is an objective entity located in the 
external world (absolutist level) (Kuhn et al., 2000).  Children reach a multiplist level 
when they are able to move from simply identifying knowledge as associated with an 
object to identifying it with the knowing subject (they become aware of the subjective 
nature of knowledge). Once children pass the false belief task (around the age of 4-5) 
they develop the ability to trace assertions of knowing back to a source distinguished 
from external reality (Kuhn et al., 2000).  However, at this stage children can focus 
primarily on the subjectivity of opinions (all opinions are right) and lack awareness that 
there could be an objective standard that could serve as a guide to compare confliction 
claims. Thus, at the evaluativist level, the child reintegrates the objective dimension of 
knowing by acknowledging uncertainty and keeping in mind evaluation (i.e., two people 
can be right, but one could be more right) (Kuhn et al., 2000).  
By school age, children recognize that exposures to different information may lead to 
different knowledge claims (Taylor, Cartwright, & Bowden, 1991). We know that 
children also vary in their levels of epistemological understanding across different 
judgment domains. For instance, coordinating the subjective and objective domains of 
knowing is more easily done in the more subjective domain of aesthetics than in the 
objective realm of moral or value judgments (Kuhn et al., 2000). Thus, perhaps 4-5-year-
olds cannot make an evaluation of the artworks based solely on the artworks because they 
are focusing on the external reality presented before them—they focus on the immoral 
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transgression rather than the properties of the artwork. The 4-5-year-olds cannot decouple 
art from the moral domain, unlike 7-8-year-olds and adults. All age groups have 
difficulty separating the moral from the aesthetic when making an emotional subjective 
liking rating. But the 7-8-year-olds can understand that one might judge the paintings as 
equally good aesthetically. They are able to realize that there is an objective standard by 
which the artworks could be evaluated (i.e., the compositional properties rather than the 
morality). Additionally perhaps when children realize that two people can have different 
views on something (multiplist) they can also realize that one person can do something 
good (paint a good work of art) and something else bad (commit and immoral deed) and 
can hence decouple. 
Future work should examine the age at which children can make an objective 
evaluation about art in general (without the influence of a morally good or bad artist). 
Then future work should examine if giving young children a clear question asking them 
to rate the artist as well as the artwork helps them to more easily decouple the moral mind 
from the artwork. 
 And lastly, future work should examine the aspects of morality on which children 
base their evaluations of art. For instance, if children had been given vignettes describing 
moral acts in which artists intentionally vs. accidentally caused harm that resulted in 
consequences varying in degrees, would their responses to the artworks depend on the 
consequences as found by Piaget and Kohlberg, or on intentionality (Young & Saxe, 
2008). 
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Conclusions 
More research on the bi-directional effects of the artist’s influence on how we 
reason about an image and then the image’s influence on how reason about the artist is 
needed. There is still a great deal of research needed to understand how contextual 
information affects our understanding of art and the relationship between moral 
contagion and art. The current studies demonstrate that how magical contagion affects 
our responses to artworks is more complex than the simple finding that the morality of 
the artist affects our responses to the artwork. As we see in both Study 1 and Study 2, 
people’s subjective liking responses are highly sensitive to beliefs about the artist’s moral 
character. And thus, artists are not completely immune to how their moral behaviors 
affect responses to their compositions. But Pope Paul III’s statement, “Men like 
Benvenuto Cellini (artists) ought not be bound by laws” is telling. Evaluative judgments 
are more objective than liking responses, and hence our judgments are less influenced by 
beliefs about the artist’s character. Instead, the aesthetic qualities of the artwork shape 
our judgment. Thus, our response to the artistic creation borne from the artist’s mind can 
rise above our response to the morality of the mind of the maker. Nonetheless, when we 
are not evaluating but are simply responding emotionally in terms of liking, our responses 
to the artist’s moral mind and to the artist’s artistic mind are not entirely separable. 
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Table 1. Summary of main results from Study 1 and 2. (*=as hypothesized) 
Study 1 Study 2 
Moral Contagion:  
*Negative items liked less than positive items. 
 
Ownership Rubs Off on Objects: 
*Objects: negative owned liked less than 
negative made. 
 
Artworks: no difference between owned vs. 
made. 
Liking 
 
Moral Contagion 
Replicates Study 1 for 
Liking: 
*Artworks by morally 
negative artists liked 
less than artworks by 
morally positive 
artists.   
 
Does it Matter for 
Liking if Content is 
Related? 
*Related content liked 
less than unrelated 
content for both artists 
of negative and 
positive moral 
character  [at all three 
ages]. 
 
Evaluative Judgment 
 
Moral Contagion 
Replicates Study 1 for 
Judgment: 
*Artworks by morally 
negative artists judged 
as less good than 
artworks by morally 
positive artists. 
 
Does it Matter for 
Judgment if Content 
is Related? 
Adults:  
*For artworks by 
artists of negative 
character, no 
difference between 
related/unrelated.   
For artworks by artists 
of positive character, 
related judged worse 
than unrelated.  
 
 
7-8-year-olds 
For artworks by artists 
of negative character, 
no difference between 
related/unrelated.    
For artworks by artists 
of positive character, 
related were judged as 
marginally better than 
unrelated.  
 
4-5-year-olds:  
For artworks by artists 
of negative character, 
related judged worse 
than unrelated. For 
artworks by artists of 
positive character, no 
difference between 
related/unrelated.    
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Appendix 1.	  List of Utilitarian Items And Digital Images of Artworks*, Study 1. [Sizing of 
artworks adjusted for the purposes of this document]. 
 
1. Shoelace 
2. Fox 
3. Toy Dog 
4. Toy Car 
5. Cup 
6. Plate 
7. Jumprope 
8. Puzzle 
9. Washcloth 
10. Notebook 
11. Basket 
12. Place Mat 
 
 
 
 
1. 
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2. 
 
 
3. 
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4.  
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6. 
 
 
 
7. 
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8. 
 
 
 
9. 
 
 
10. 
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11. 
 
 
12. 
 
*All Artworks © Copyright Steve Hawley Studios 2012. 
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Appendix 2. Vignettes Accompanying Objects and Artworks (Adults only), Study 1.  
BAD 
• This was owned by a serial rapist who was responsible for the rape of 13 women.  
This was made by a serial rapist who was responsible for the rape of 13 women. 
 
• This was owned by a child molester who molested 21 children.   
This was made by a child molester who molested 21 children.  
 
• This was owned by a member of a neo-Nazi organization.    
This was made by a member of a neo-Nazi organization.   
 
• This was owned by an arsonist who is responsible for setting fires that led to the 
death of 9 people.  
This was made by an arsonist who is responsible for setting fires that led to the 
death of 9 people.  
 
• This was owned by a former member of the Ku Klux Klan.  
This was made by a former member of the Ku Klux Klan. 
 
• This was owned by someone who mutilates animals. 
This was made by someone who mutilates animals.  
 
GOOD 
• This was owned by doctor who works for an organization that provides free 
healthcare for families in need.  
This was made by doctor who works for an organization that provides free 
healthcare for families in need.  
 
• This was owned by a person who ran an orphanage and connected thousands of 
children with families. 
This was made by a person who ran an orphanage and connected thousands of 
children with families. 
 
• This was owned by a person who founded a company for educational toys for 
deaf children.  
This was made by a person who founded a company for educational toys for deaf 
children.  
 
• This was owned by a nurse who provides free house calls on the weekends for 
war veterans.  
This was made by a nurse who provides free house calls on the weekends for war 
veterans.  
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• This was owned by a teacher who developed a revolutionary reading program for 
the blind.  
This was made by a teacher who developed a revolutionary reading program for 
the blind.  
 
• This was owned by a person who founded a tuition free summer camp for 
children with cancer. 
This was made by a person who founded a tuition free summer camp for children 
with cancer. 
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Appendix 3. Twelve Representational Paintings and Accompanying Vignettes, Study 2 
(Related left, Unrelated right) [Sizing of artworks adjusted for the purposes of this 
document]. 
 
1.  
	  	  	   	  	   
Adult 
Good: A man who is an artist painted this. He owned an ice cream truck and would 
surprise local orphanages with free ice cream on the weekends.  
Bad: A man who is an artist painted this. He owned an ice cream truck and would to go to 
local parks to sell ice cream to lure children into his truck to molest them.  
Child 
Good: This was painted by a nice ice cream man surprises children with a  
new toy when they get their ice cream to make them happy.  
Bad: This was painted by a mean ice cream man who surprises children with a  
rotten apple when they get their ice cream to make them sad.  
 2.	  	  
	  	  
Adult 
Good: A woman who is an artist painted this. She worked for a village where she helped 
grow herbal remedies to ease cancer patient’s pain.  
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Bad: A woman who is an artist painted this. She worked for a village where she grew 
cyanide for various cults.   
Child 
Good: This was painted by a nice gardener who helps plants and trees by  
spraying them with a special liquid to make them grow.  
Bad: This was painted by a mean gardener who destroys plants and trees by  
spraying them with a special poison to make them die.  
 
3. 
         
 
Adult 
Good: A woman who is an artist painted this. She donated her time in an afterschool 
program for at risk youth. She did this to help children find jobs and get scholarships. 
Bad: A woman who is an artist painted this. She donated her time in an afterschool 
program for at risk youth. She did this to lure young girls into sex trafficking. 
 
 
Child 
Good: This was painted by a nice teacher who helps his students when they are upset. 
Bad: This was painted by a mean teacher who yells at his students when they are upset.  
 
4.  
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Adult 
Good: A man who is an artist painted this. He worked for a homeless shelter, rescuing 
animals who were been abused.   
Bad: A man who is an artist painted this. He worked for an animal shelter, secretly 
abusing animals.   
Child 
Good: This was painted by a nice dog walker who loves dogs and often pets them.  
Bad: This was painted by a mean dog walker who hates dogs and often kicks them. 
 
5. 
     
Adult 
A woman who is an artist painted this. She babysat for children and when they cried too 
much she sang and played with them until they stopped.   
Bad: A woman who is an artist painted this. She babysits for children and when they cry 
too much she shook them violently until they stopped.  
Child 
This was painted by a nice babysitter who fixes children’s broken toys.  
Bad: This was painted by a mean babysitter who breaks children’s toys.  
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6. 
       
Adult 
Good: A woman who is an artist painted this. She baked cupcakes that included organic, 
local ingredients to support local farms and promote well-being. 
Bad: A woman who is an artist painted this. She baked cupcakes that sometimes included 
animal feces, because of the unsanitary conditions of her working space. 
Child 
Good: This was painted by a mean baker who puts extra salt in people’s cupcakes to 
make them taste really bad.  
Bad: This was painted by a nice baker who puts sugar in people’s cupcakes to make them 
taste really good.  
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Figure	  1.	  Liking	  ratings	  for	  artworks	  and	  utilitarian	  objects	  associated	  with	  mean	  vs.	  nice	  moral	  character,	  Study	  1.	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Figure	  2.	  Liking	  ratings	  for	  objects	  and	  artworks	  owned	  vs.	  made	  by	  morally	  bad	  people,	  Study	  1.	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Figure 3. Liking ratings by three age groups for artworks and utilitarian objects 
associated with mean vs. nice moral character, Study 1.   
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Figure 4. Mean liking and evaluative judgment ratings across age for artworks by nice vs. 
mean artists, Study 2.  
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Figure 5. Liking ratings by three age groups for artworks by mean artists with related and 
unrelated content, Study 2.   	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Figure 6. Evaluative judgment ratings by three age groups for artworks by mean artists 
with related and unrelated content, Study 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1	  
2	  
3	  
4	  
5	  
6	  
7	  
Children	  Ages	  4-­‐5	   Children	  Ages	  7-­‐8	   Adults	  
Ev
al
ua
ti
ve
	  Ju
dg
m
en
t	  R
at
in
g	  
Age	  
Related	  Unrelated	  
*	  
	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  105	  
Figure 7. Mean liking and evaluative judgment ratings (combined) by three age groups 
for artworks with content related/unrelated to artist’s mean moral character, Study 2. 
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